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Drawing on the theoretical and experimental literature on distributive justice, we put some 
assumptions of the contractarian argument to an empirical test by means of an experiment which 
investigates the influence that explicit agreement under the veil of ignorance may have on 
individuals’ conception of justice and its implementation in a context of the production and 
distribution of a common output. One crucial characteristic of our experiment is that subjects are 
assigned unequal endowments for which they are not responsible; the assignment is random. At the 
same time, their work naturally generates unequal levels of earnings. 
Do the subjects involved in this interaction distinguish between the two types of inequality? Do 
they try to reduce the arbitrary one, while accepting the one generated through effort? Do they 
elaborate other distributive criteria? Does their choice ex-ante, when they are behind the veil, differ 
from their choice ex-post once the veil has been lifted and they know the outcome of the production 
phase? The main result is that the agreement under a veil of ignorance induces subjects to accept a 
liberal egalitarian division rule not only in the ex-ante agreement, but also in the actual 
implementation of the pie division, even if this contradicts their self-interest and some common 
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Distributive Justice with Production and the Social Contract. 
An Experimental study 
 
1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to provide experimental evidence on the influence that explicit agreement 
under the veil of ignorance may have on individuals’ conception of justice and its implementation 
in a context of production.  
Drawing on the experimental literature on distributive justice, we put some theoretical assumptions 
of the contractarian argument to an empirical test by means of an experiment in which individuals 
play for real money in a laboratory situation that models the idea of an agreement behind a veil of 
ignorance, followed by implementation of the agreed distributive rule(s) in a context of decision in 
the absence of coercive authority. One crucial characteristic of our experiment is that subjects are 
assigned unequal endowments for which they are not responsible; the assignment is random. At the 
same time, their work naturally generates unequal levels of earnings.  
Do the subjects involved in this interaction distinguish between the two types of inequality? Do 
they try to reduce the random one, while accepting the one generated through work? Do they 
elaborate other distributive criteria? Does their choice ex-ante, when they are ignorant of whether 
chance will favor them in the distribution of endowments, differ from their choice ex-post, once 
they know both their initial luck and their relative performance?  
In fact, the main result that we obtain is that, in a context of division of the output of a real 
production, the experimental simulation of the agreement under a veil of ignorance on principles of 
justice induces agents to accept a liberal egalitarian division rule not only in the ex-ante agreement 
but also in the actual implementation of the pie division, after real production activity has been 
carried out. And they do so even if this contradicts their self-interest and some common economic 
assumptions about reciprocal expectations of rationality. 
Our experiment is relevant to two strands of literature. First, it contrasts with the experimental 
literature on distributive justice as it has evolved to date. On the one hand, studies inspired by 
Rawls’s principles of justice, in fact, focus almost exclusively either on the relevance of the 
difference principle (Brickman, 1977; Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984; Frohlich et al. 1987; Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer 1990 and 1992; Bond and Park, 1991; Lissowski, Tyszka, Okrasa, 1991; Jackson and 
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Hill; 1995; Michelbach et al. 2003; De la Cruz-Doña and Martina, 2000) or on the effects of the 
choice behind the veil of ignorance on stated preferences for redistribution (Anderson and Lyttkens 
1999; Traub et al. 2005; Herne and Suojanen, 2004; Herne and Mard, 2008; Schildberg-Hörisch, 
2010; Durante, Putterman and van der Weele, 2014). No study (except Faillo et al. 2015) has taken 
into consideration Rawls’ concept of “sense of justice” and its role in the solution of the problem of 
ex-post compliance with the principle chosen behind the veil. In the typical experiment, once the 
principle has been chosen, it is automatically implemented. Considering the subset of studies that 
explicitly implement the choice among alternative principles, participants usually choose 
individually as they are confronted with hypothetical scenarios (Scott et al., 2001; Konow, 1996, 
2001, 2003). To our knowledge, only Frohlich et al. (1987), and Faillo et al. (2015) have 
implemented agreement among participants as a way to choose the principles. In our experiment we 
take some steps forward with respect to this literature by: i) introducing an explicit (non-binding) 
agreement behind a veil of ignorance – in fact, we compare two alternative agreement procedures; 
ii) introducing a production phase in which the outcome depends on both luck and individual effort; 
and iii) studying the determinants of individuals’ willingness to comply, ex-post, with the agreed 
principle.  
Secondly, our study gives more substance to the ‘social contract approach’ to business ethics. With 
this expression we refer to the so-called Social Contract tradition in Business Ethics (Wempe 2005), 
as most notably represented by Donaldson (1982), Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), Phillips (2003), 
Evan and Freeman (1988), Freeman (1994), Bishop (2008), Lütge (2012, 2015). More specifically, 
however, we draw on Sacconi’s view of the firm as an institution that can be normatively 
reconstructed as the result of a constitutional agreement among its essential stakeholders (Sacconi 
2000, 2006, 2011a,b). This view is in line with Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder perspective (see also 
Evan and Freeman 1993; Freeman et al.2011), and with Aoki’s (1984, 2010) cooperative theory of 
the firm. For its theoretical-normative core, it rests on Binmore’s (2005) re-casting of Rawlsian 
contractarianism (Rawls 1971), and Buchanan’s (1975) logical reconstruction of constitutional and 
post-constitutional contracts. The basic idea is that the normative basis of the firm can be conceived 
as the result of a unanimous hypothetical agreement among all the firm’s constitutive stakeholders. 
The content of the agreement is the set of principles and the governance structure that define a 
mutually beneficial cooperative venture under the rules of a market economy. In this experimental 
work, we inquire whether real-life subjects, who participate in a situation involving the relevant 
intuitions of justice concerning the division of the pooled output of a productive activity, actually 
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follow principles consistent with the social contract perspective in business ethics as outlined above. 
Obviously, we do not claim that our experiment represents all the complexities of the firm’s 
productive activity, and its related governance structure. Only a stylized representation of some 
features of it can be subjected to laboratory experimentation. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
theoretical literature on the social contract of the firm, our experimental study adds an element of 
realism (Francés-Gómez et al. 2015). We inquire empirically whether real-life agents, when 
involved in an experimental simulation of the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” ensuringthat they assess 
principles of division impartially, converge – not just in principle but also in practice –on the 
distributive principle recommended by a social contract. This is a principle of distribution that, 
according to the liberal egalitarian view, would rectify the effects of an initial arbitrary allocation of 
rights over production means, and would disentangle such effects from those attributable only to 
personal contribution and desert (see the next section for a theoretical discussion of this point). One 
may say that real economic environments or the governance structures of most firms seldom de 
facto satisfy (and certainly do not satisfy by any logical necessity) ideal conditions of justice. Hence 
our inquiry seems relevant to giving substance to contractarian business ethics by seeing whether 
real-life agents uphold contractarian principles of justice in such non-ideal productive contexts, so 
that they would be ready to rectify distribution outcomes after entering the experiment of the ‘veil 
of ignorance’. 
Before describing the experimental design and our empirical hypotheses, in Sections 2 and 3 we 
summarize the theoretical background of the research. 
 
2.  Theoretical background (I): the contractarian argument leading to liberal egalitarianism. 
In our experiment, thesubjects were asked to agree on a distributive rule before they knew their own 
endowment, their own ability to contribute to production, and their actual effort. They were offered 
a number of possible rules, representing the most common intuitions about distributive justice. One 
of these rules –the liberal egalitarian rule– played a crucial role in our working hypotheses and 
consequently, in interpreting the experiment results. 
Even if the rule itself does not exactly coincide with Rawls’s second principle of justice, it will 
sound familiar to all acquainted with Rawls’s theory, and it is virtually coincident with what 
Dworkin (2013) has suggested as a principle of social justice. In what follows we provide a detailed 
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specification of the theoretical reasoning behind our version of the liberal egalitarian rule and its 
connection with the contractarian approach. We propose to do so by means of a five-step argument: 
1. First, let us accept two widely-held ideas about distributive justice: the egalitarian one and the 
desert/merit one. They are related to various philosophical traditions that need not be spelledout 
here. Egalitarianism claims that prospective participants in a joint venture deserve equal 
consideration and respect; while the conception of ‘just desert’ – or distribution proportional to 
contribution – focuses on the moral idea of responsible agency.  
2. These two broad intuitions fit quite naturally into two contexts often found in economic 
approaches to theories of justices. These contexts can be dubbed ‘manna from heaven’ and 
‘non-manna from heaven’ respectively. The first is the kind of situation in which a certain 
resource or good (sometime simplistically money, but also rights over resources or means of 
production) is given to the subjects to be distributed. In this case, insofar as there is no relevant 
difference amongst individuals, equality seems the obvious principle of distribution.1 However, 
when subjects must earn the resources or goods in question, for example by working, keeping 
what one has earned by freely making a personal effort is seen as just.2 
3. The social contract theory enables us to organize these two contexts hierarchically according to 
the two-tier model of constitutional and post-constitutional contracts (Buchanan 1975, Brock 
1979, Sacconi 2000, 2006, 2011b). The agreement on the constitution is prior to any 
contribution. This agreement establishes the basic ‘rules of the game’. This is the idea that a 
constitution allocates a set of rights to action. Essential among the latter are endowments of 
means of production and capabilities to be used in the next stage of social cooperation. 
Thereafter, specific cooperative ventures are established. These ventures are based on a post-
constitutional agreement: subjects endowed with an amount of rights and capabilities must agree 
on how to distribute the surplus deriving from cooperation, in order precisely to set up mutually 
acceptable cooperative ventures. In the first stage, the egalitarian intuition seems to be the only 
focal point for agreement. But in the second stage, distribution proportional to contribution may 
be a rational agreement. 
																																								 																				
1A distribution proportional to relative needs – because needs are independent from contributions – may also fit the 
“manna from heaven” context. However, the constitutional choice is taken under a veil of ignorance. This prevents to 
have knowledge of the details of different individual life plans, and hence who needs what differential means in order to 
pursue her/his life-plan. Because there is no basis on which to distinguish among individual needs, at this level of 
analysis needs can be set as equal. Everybody equally needs some basic set of endowments in order to be able to pursue 
whatever life-plan.	
2Illuminating on these distinctions are the arguments set out in Dworkin (1981a,b), Roemer (1986, 1996), Cohen 
(1989).	
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4. This point can be made analytically precise by a game-theoretical formulation of the two-tier 
constitutional/post-constitutional agreement model that defines it as a two-stage bargaining 
game (Brock 1979, Sacconi 2000, 2006, 2011b). At the initial stage bargaining focuses on the 
selection of a sub-set of strategies for each player from the overall set of all possible strategies - 
i.e. players select a constitution consisting of a limitation on any players’ possibility of action, 
essentially curtailing the possibility of opportunistic behavior, and facilitating beneficial joint 
strategies. Then each player, being endowed with a particular sub-set of strategies, accedes to 
the second stage game – the sub-game resulting from taking as feasible only the strategy 
combinations allowed by the constitution. This is a cooperative game in which benefit (surplus) 
derives from the participation of players in several possible coalitions, and where no significant 
benefit can be secured by players acting on their own. One common solution concept for this 
kind of games is the ‘Shapley value’, whereby the cooperative benefit is allotted to players 
proportionally to the differential increase that each player contributes to the value of any 
possible coalition in the game. But of course contribution depends substantially on the 
constraints set by the initial selection of the constitution. In fact, assuming that agents are 
equally rational, their contribution is strictly conditioned by the initial restriction on strategy-
sets decided through the first-stage bargaining solution. So, what about the initial-stage 
bargaining solution? From an abstract point of view, all kinds of constitutions could be selected 
at this stage. But then some possible coalition formation would reflect an antecedent asymmetry 
of power –as it actually happens in the real world. Coalitions of this sort could allot a minimum 
share of the total surplus to some parties simply because they had no bargaining power in the 
first place. But if we situate hypothetically behind a veil of ignorance, no rational bargainers 
would accept this. Rational players would restrict the set of feasible strategies to those allowed 
by a constitution that prevents opportunism and exploitation. In other words, they would agree 
to form mutually beneficial coalitions only after having secured basic rights/endowments for all. 
They would secure equal endowments first; and only afterwards they would bargain their way 
into coalitions that are mutually beneficial. To put it formally, in order to agree on a constitution 
at the initial stage, a rational agent must reason backwards: s/he must calculate, first, her/his 
expected payoff under any cooperative post-constitutional sub-game; then s/he must go back to 
the constitutional stage and choose among the cooperative sub-game solutions the one that most 
satisfies the conditions for an optimal agreement at the initial stage. At this stage, players play a 
symmetrical bargaining game. No differential contribution may be claimed at this point since 
neither different allocations of endowments nor their differential use may have still occurred - as 
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far as any possible allocation of endowments (strategy sub-sets) to players is still possible (i.e. 
for any endowment allocation assigning an advantage to a player also a symmetrical allocation, 
under which the players positions are symmetrically exchanged, is possible). The bargaining 
space is therefore symmetrical, and hence players must adopt the ‘egalitarian solution’: the Nash 
Bargaining Solution under a symmetrical payoff space(Nash 1950, Binmore 2005, Sacconi 
2006, 2011b).  
5. Of course, in the real business world endowments are not distributed equally. This means that 
the constitution may have failed in distributing basic endowments equally, so that this is not an 
ideal situation of justice. Under this arbitrary condition, co-operative productive ventures yield 
arbitrarily unequal distributions of benefits – even if they have followed a fair proportional 
principle. Justice – according the view mentioned above –would require, first, making 
endowments equal, and only thereafter applying a proportional principle to the final distribution. 
Our question is therefore whether individuals situated behind a veil of ignorance would perceive 
that the arbitrary distribution of endowments is no ground for making a claim to a 
commonoutcome. If they do, they would choose a distribution rule whose effect is to redress 
that initial arbitrarinessas much as possible3.  
																																								 																				
3The liberal egalitarian principle on which we focus in this work is akin to James Konow’s accountability principle 
(Konow, 1996, 2000, 2003,2005) according to which “fair allocations are proportional to the contributions agents 
control (called ‘discretionary’ variables) but do not adjust for factors they cannot influence (called ‘exogenous’ 
variables)”(Konow, 2005: 378).  If we apply this principle in a productive context, if a worker is twice as productive as 
her colleague, an allocation assigning twice as her colleague to the more productive worker would be deemed fair if the 
difference in productivity is due to different effort.  But the same distribution would be judged as unfair if the difference 
is due to variables beyond the direct control of the two workers (for example, different working conditions). (For a more 
recent empirical study focused on the application of this principle see Cappelen et al., 2014).  What our view of the 
liberal egalitarian principle adds to Konow’s idea, is an explicit justification – missing in Konow’s definition- of why 
equality is fair in absence of any discretionary factor that justifies unequal distributions. According to liberal 
egalitarians like Rawls  (Rawls 1971) and Dworkin (Dworkin 1981b), individuals are morally equal persons deserving 
equal consideration and respect, and the introduction of any difference among them must be morally justified in terms 
of outcomes that  they can be responsible for because of their agency and independently of the results of social and 
natural lottery. 
Another benchmark to compare Konow’s accountability principle with our results supporting the liberal egalitarian 
principle is how different the understanding of impartiality is in the two cases. Konow distinguishes between 
stakeholders and spectators, and he shows that stakeholders are affected by self-serving biases in allocations while the 
spectators are not. We also find this result in what we call the ‘no-veil’ treatment, where subjects make their decisions 
without being put behind a veil of ignorance.  In fact, we don't see any convergence on the liberal egalitarian rule in 
such a context, whereas we find it substantially when subjects are put in a context of impartial deliberation (behind a 
veil of ignorance concerning their identity in the game). The two approaches have in common the role of impartiality in 
adopting fair distributive rules, but in addition we find that the stakeholders themselves, once they have the opportunity 
to deliberate under the veil don't show any self-serving bias (or at least, a weaker one).  
This relates to a main difference in modelling impartiality. We enquire the explicit agreement among ‘stakeholders’ 
under the veil of ignorance, whereas Konow works with third-person impartial spectators –  i.e. we work  in the 
contractarian  tradition whereas he is  in the impartial spectator perspective. This allows us to say what the stakeholders 
themselves would do when positioned behind the veil, and moreover whether they comply ex post with their impartial 
agreement, which cannot be done  by taking the third party spectator perspective. 
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The endowment that our experiment distributed unequally was time. Subjects had to perform a task 
in pairs, but one member was randomly assigned six minutes, and the other one ten minutes. The 
‘liberal egalitarian’ rule that we tested with our experimental subjects established the following 
distribution: assign each member of the pair what she/he has produced in the first six minutes; then 
distribute what the member who had ten minutes produced in the last four minutes equally among 
both. As made clear above, according to the theory of the social contract the rule chosen under the 
veil of ignorance should be the liberal egalitarian one: inequalities should be caused only by the 
subjects’ differential use of an equal endowment of time, whereas arbitrary inequalities of 
endowments should be neutralized – because, in fact, according to the rule its output is re-
distributed equally. The question is whether ordinary experimental subjects, faced with random 
initial endowments allocation and the output of their actual work, would agree on such a rule or 
choose another, maybe simpler, one. 
We added four more rules from which to choose. Two of them were obvious candidates for 
comparison with liberal egalitarianism: pure egalitarianism (the total product is distributed 
equally), and merit purely based on contribution (each subject gets what she/he has individually 
produced).The other two rules reflect views that are typical in economic contexts: self-interest(each 
subject claims the entire product of the pair), and distribution strictly proportional to productivity 
(so that the person with less endowment may actually get more if s/he has been more productiveper 
minute).  
 
3. Theoretical background (II): ex-post choice and the “the sense of justice”. 
By including in our experiment an actual distributive decision after the veil has been removed and 
production has taken place, we sought to test the motivational force of the agreement itself. 
Rawls’s theory makes the crucial assumption that individuals possess a ‘sense of justice’. They can 
be motivated to act in accordance with fair principles provided that there is common knowledge that 
they have been accepted through an impartial process, and others do the same. This assumption 
empirically implies that if a process is implemented to assure subjects that the distribution rule that 
they have adopted is fair, they should be motivated to comply with it, simply because of its fairness 
and the expected reciprocity of others in respecting the principles. This conjecture would have a 
great impact on applied ethics. It may imply that making participants (stakeholders) aware of the 
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justice of the rules would enhance compliance. And in particular, involving them in the process of 
agreement on distributive criteria would enhance compliance, with little or no need for control. And 
this would be a result useful for institutional design. 
No matter which moral theory one favors, the ‘veil of ignorance’ can be regarded as capturing our 
considered view about fairness (Binmore 2005). It is not obvious that an agreement behind the veil 
would by itself make the subjects more prone to be fair when the veil is lifted. But this would be 
exactly the case if Rawls is right about individuals possessing a ‘sense of justice’. If this sense does 
indeed work in ordinary people, then a distribution principle that is rationally agreed behind a veil 
of ignorance would be seen under a special light also ex-post, so that people would be inclined to 
comply with it, even in the face of strong incentives to defect. What really counts in eliciting a 
preference for compliance are (i)participation in the impartial agreement, and (ii) that  the 
agreement elicits a mental model of an agent that, having agreed, also intends to carry out the 
agreed action. The agreement can thus be seen as a kind of moral learning device.  
Focusing now on the liberal egalitarian rule, if the theory is sound we should then observe that those  
subjects who reach an agreement on this rule– according to the theory outlined in Section 3,this 
should be the majority of subjects who solve theirex ante bargaining game rationally – will easily 
find a motivation to comply. Because their agreement has been rational, they may align their actual 
free choice with the agreement that they willingly made. The hypothesis here is that those subjects 
who have ex-ante agreed on the liberal egalitarian rule develop the attitude to conform with that rule 
also when the veil has been removed, just because they want to act on the basis of their rational 
agreement; and they also expect that symmetrically situated others will do the same. Thus, the real 
choice, after the veil has been removed, does not test the impartial reasons to agree on a distributive 
principle chosen behind the veil of ignorance (as most experimental literature has tested), but the 
motivational force of the agreement in a compliance context.  
According to standard economic rationality, individual decisions in the kind of game that we used 
(a ‘dictator game’) should be selfish: no matter what has been agreed, a dictatorial position (after 
the veil has been lifted) should bend decisions toward individual interests. This is all the more so if 
one thinks of the individual who gets lucky in the initial distribution of endowments. S/he has the 
chance to produce a larger part of the total output, so that s/he can easily rationalize a claim to all 
that s/he has produced, instead of sharing equally the production resulting from his/her excess 
endowment, as the liberal egalitarian principle requires. Since, according to traditional economic 
10	
	
theory of motivation, it is not rational to comply with the agreement, one should not expect other 
agents to willingly comply on their own. But the social contract perspective allows a reversal of this 
expectation by considering that an ex-ante agreement  –if recognized as rational– may affect agents’ 
preferences and beliefs.4 
To investigate whether and how the agreement under the veil of ignorance may actually elicit such 
preferences, we used two different agreement procedures. The first one we call ‘bargaining’. It 
consisted in a series of offers and counter-offers that a subject simply saw on his/her computer 
screen when they had been ‘submitted’ through his/her or the counter-party’s vote - so that they 
could insist on their vote, make a new proposal, or accept the counter-party’s proposal by voting for 
it in the following bargaining round. The second procedure we call ‘chat’. In this case, the choice of 
rule was preceded by an anonymous on-line chat. The idea was to test whether the possibility of a 
discussion using natural language –even if through a chat interfacethat kept identities veiled– 
should enhance the possibility of agreement. This would be suggested by a deliberative approach to 
economic justice (Ulrich 2008, Baur & Palazzo 2011). Natural language may help subjects to 
discuss the merits of each rule, and argue for the rationality and fairness of each, so that their 
agreement may be consciously based on the moral merits of a certain rule. If we follow Habermas’s 
case for discourse ethics, an agreement that is reached because reasons are offered –as opposed to 
an agreement reached simply to end a bargaining procedure– should be normatively superior and 
therefore more motivationally efficacious for individuals with a disposition toward justice. The chat 
procedure might enhance commitment to the agreed rule; but its real force would lie in the fact that 
the participants can offer each other reasons for choosing a rule.  
 
 
4. Experimental design and procedures. 
																																								 																				
4 A reformulation of economic rationality consistent with the sense of justice has been suggested – also with the support 
of early experimental tests – by the theory of conformist preferences (see Grimalda and Sacconi 2005, Sacconi and 
Faillo 2010, Sacconi 2011c, Faillo, Ottone and Sacconi 2011, 2015) in so called ‘psychological games’ (see 
Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Rabin 1993). After an ex ante agreement, agents develop ideal preferences favorable to 
implementation of the agreed principle which are intrinsically dependent on the formation of first-order and second-
order beliefs predicting reciprocal compliance by the interacting agents with the principle and alignment of reciprocal 
beliefs with behaviors conforming (in turn) with the principle.		
.	
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The experiment consisted of three treatments: Noveil, Bargaining and Chat. In all the treatments 
subjects were matched in pairs, and asked to perform a task. In each pair one subject was randomly 
given six minutes and the other ten minutes to perform the task. Subjects generated an amount of 
money that depended on the outcome of the task. At the end of the task each subject was asked how 
to divide the total amount of money produced by the pair through the task. They could answer either 
by reporting the percentage to be assigned to each member of the pair or by choosing a division 
corresponding to one of five rules proposed by the experimenter. Henceforth, we will call this latter 
decision the “ex-post choice” to distinguish it from the former or “ex-ante” choice, which is 
material only to the Bargaining and Chat treatments. In these treatments, in fact, before performing 
the task and before knowing who would have six minutes and who ten minutes to perform the task, 
the members of each pair had to agree on one of the five division rules mentioned below. We will 
refer to this phase also as the “ex-ante agreement”. For the sake of comparability with the other 
treatments, we will refer to the division choice as the “ex-post choice” also in the NoVeil treatment, 
even if in this treatment there was no “ex-ante agreement” phase. Once the subjects had decided, 
one of the two members was randomly selected and his/her choice was implemented.  
In all the treatments, the subjects knew about all the phases of the experiment from the beginning, 
before they made their very first choice. 
A detailed presentation of the treatments is provided in what follows. 
 
4.1 Noveil treatment 
In the Noveil treatment subjects were randomly matched in pairs. The treatment consisted of three 
phases in the following sequence: a practice phase, a task phase, and a division phase. We describe 
the three phases following the order used in the instructions, in which subjects first learned about 
the task and the division phases, and then about the practice phase.  
 
The task 
The task consisted in encoding words. In each pair, one of the subjects was given a total time of ten 
minutes to perform the task, while the other was given only six minutes. The assignment was 
random. Information about the time limits was given just before the task. A sequence of words 
appeared on the subjects’ screens, and using a conversion table they had to convert the words into 
sequences of numbers. A new word appeared only after a code (either correct or mistaken) was 
written for the current word. The remaining time was shown through a countdown on the computer 
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screen. The total production (i.e. the number of tokens- one token=0.15 euros) generated in the task 
corresponded to the number of words correctly encoded by the two subjects.  
At the end of the task, the following data were provided to the subjects: the total production (total 
number of words correctly encoded) of the pair, individual productions of the two members of the 
pair, productivity (number of words/minute) of each member, production and productivity of the 
subject with the ten minutes both in the first six minutes and in the second four minutes.  
 
The division phase and the rules. 
In the division phase (or “ex-post choice”) each member of the pair was asked to choose separately 
how to divide the total income generated by the pair in the task phase. S/he could do this either by 
choosing a percentage from 0 to 100%5 of the total income to ask for him/herself or by choosing a 
division corresponding to the application of one of the five division rules. Subjects saw on their 
screens the final payoffs corresponding to the application of each of the five rules. No request to 
agree was involved at this stage.   
 
The rules were the following: 
1) Rule 1 – Equal split: each subject obtains exactly half of the total product generated through the 
activity performed by the two subjects. 
Example: subject A encodes 60 words in 10minutes; subject B produces 40 words in 6 minutes. 
Both subject A and subject B obtain (60+40)/2=50 tokens. 
2) Rule 2 – One gets all: one subject obtains all the total product generated through the activity 
performed by the two subjects. A random draw selects the subject who gets 100% of the total 
product. Both subjects have a 50% probability of being selected. 
Example: subject A encodes 60 words in 10 minutes; subject B encodes 40words in 6 minutes. The 
subject who is randomly selected (50% of probability to be selected) obtains 60+40=100 tokens, the 
other subject obtains 0. 
3) Rule  3 – One gets what one has produced: each subject obtains exactly what s/he has produced 
through his/her activity.  
Example: subject A encodes 60 words in 10 minutes; subject B encodes 40 words in 6 minutes. 
Subject A obtains 60 tokens, subject B obtains 40 tokens. 
																																								 																				
5 The option of free percentages characterized also the ex-post division choice in the two treatments with the agreement 
(see below). The possibility to choose a free percentage put compliance with the rule agreed behind the veil of 
ignorance in the worst condition to be realized. In fact, free percentages ensured that no subjects complied with the 
agreement because of the lack of alternatives.  
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4) Rule 4 – Time independent division: each subject obtains what s/he has produced through her 
activity during the first 6 minutes; what is produced by the subject who has 10 minutes of time in 
the last 4 minutes is divided at 50% between the two subjects. 
Example: subject A encodes 40 words in the first six minutes and 20 words in the second four 
minutes; subject B encodes 40 words in 6 minutes. Subject A obtains 40+(20/2)=50 tokens and 
subjects B obtains 40+(20/2)=50 tokens. 
5) Rule 5 – Divide according to productivity: if the ratio between the productivity (words per 
minute) of A and B is x, then A’s payoff should be x times the payoff of B, subject to the constraint 
that the sum of the two payoffs is equal to the total income produced by the pair. 
Example: subject A produces 60 words  in 10 minutes,  subject B produces 40 in 6 minutes. The 
ratio between A’s and B’s productivity is 6/6.66= 0.90. The payoff of A should be 0.90 times the 
payoff of B, and the sum of the two payoffs should be 60+40=100 tokens. A’s payoff is 47.4 tokens 
and B’s payoff is 52.6 tokens. 
 
When choosing the division, subjects could read the text of the rules, and they were also shown the 
payoff which they would obtain if that rule was applied, given the outcome of the task.  
Once both the members of the pair had made their individual decisions, by opting for a division 
consistent with one out of the five rules or for a percentage, one of the members of the pair was 
randomly selected and his/her decision was implemented.  
 
The practice phase. 
Before starting the task, the subjects could practice with the rules, individually, by using a 
simulation platform that replicated the actual division choice screen of the third phase. They could 
read the five rules on their screen and choose one of them. They could also insert the number of 
words encoded by the person with six minutes and by the one with ten minutes both in the first six 
minutes and in the remaining four minutes, and they could decide the person (the one with six 
minutes or the one with ten minutes) whose final choice would be selected. They could play with 
the platform for five minutes, changing the parameters and checking the resulting outcomes. Figure 
1a reports the exact sequence of the phases. 
 
 
4.2  Bargaining treatment 
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In the Bargaining treatment, the practice phase, the task and the division phase (or “ex-post choice”) 
were the same as in the NoVeil treatment, but the task and the division phases were preceded by a 
stage in which the members of the pair, before knowing the allocation of the time for the task, could 
reach an ex-ante agreement on one of the same five rules through a bargaining procedure – the 
agreement did not concern the choice of a percentage from 0 to 100% of the total production (see 
Figure 1b for the exact sequence of the phases). The procedure consisted of a maximum of thirteen 
rounds. In the first six rounds, subjects simultaneously chose one of the rules, proposing it for the 
final division of the total product generated through the task. They could choose the rule using a 
choice screen similar to the final division choice screen. At the end of each round, they were 
informed about the rule chosen by their partner, and if they had chosen the same rule, this was an 
agreement. Pairs unable to reach an agreement on one of the rules (by choosing the same rule) in 
the first six rounds accessed a second bargaining stage of four sequential choices. Each sequential 
choice consisted of an offer and, if the receiver refused it, of a counter-offer. At the beginning of 
each of the two sequential choices, one of the two members of the pair was randomly selected to 
make the first offer. The other member, once s/he had received the offer, decided whether to accept 
or refuse it. If s/he rejected the offer, then s/he had to make a counter-offer that might be accepted 
or refused by the counterpart. Pairs that failed toreachingan agreement also in this second stage 
moved to a final sequence of three further simultaneous choices.6The subjects knew that the rule 
was not going to be enforced, but they also knew that they could proceed to the experiment’s next 
phase (the task) only if they reached an agreement. If they failed, they would be excluded from the 
experiment and they would be asked to fill in a questionnaire not related with the experiment. In 
this case, their earning would be equal to the initial 3 euros. 
The agreement phase was preceded by the practice phase, which allowed subjects to become 
familiar with the choice interface and to the consequences, in terms of final payoffs, of their 
decisions.  
																																								 																				
6The first sequence of simultaneous division proposals was introduced in order to capture the simultaneous nature of the 
bargaining. The second sequential bargaining phase was introduced to help break possible non-coordination cycles in 
the simultaneous choices. Finally, the last simultaneous choices phase wasintended to prevent agreements reached in the 
sequential bargaining phase from suffering the typical hold-up problem that characterizes finite sequential bargaining, 
in which the second to last mover has an advantage over the last mover. The former, in fact, can put the latter in the 
condition to accept or refuse his/her preferred rule. By introducing a third simultaneous bargaining phase, we gave 
subjects the possibility to escape from the hold-up problem after having been involved in the first two phases. Note that 
only two pairs failed to reach an agreement within the first sequence of simultaneous choices. They reached the 
agreement in the first attempt pertaining to the sequential bargaining phase.	
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In the ex-post choice, subjects were reminded of the rule chosen by their pair (the rule appeared also 
with a different background color) in the ex-ante agreement, and they could choose either a 
percentage of the total product to ask for themselves, a division of the total product corresponding 
to application of the agreed rule, or a division corresponding to the application of a different rule. 
As in the NoVeil treatment, the final payoffs corresponding to the application of each of the five 
rules were reported on the subjects’ computer screens. 
4.3 Chat treatment 
The Chat treatment was very similar to the Bargaining treatment. Subjects had to reach an 
agreement on one of the five division rules in order to access the task and the ex-post division 
phase. However in this treatment the ex-ante agreement procedure was based on a chat. Subjects 
were given five minutes for discussion. The chat was anonymous. Communication of personal 
information, PC number, threats, promises of side payments and the use of offensive language were 
prohibited. Once the two members of the pair had reached an agreement, they had to choose the 
same rule on a choice screen similar to the final division choice screen. The choice of the same rule 
could be done at any time within the limit of 5 minutes available to discuss through the chat 
function. Thus, selecting the same rule on the screen after having agreed to it by the chat was a way 
to make clear that the agreement had been actually reached and that there was no misunderstanding 
about it.7All the pairs succeeded in choosing the same rule (it took on average 3.75 minutes). As in 
the Bargaining treatment, they knew that the agreement was not going to be enforced in the later 
stage of the game, but if they had failed to reach the agreement they would have been excluded 
from the experiment and asked to fill in a general questionnaire not related with the experiment. See 
Figure 1c for the exact sequence of the phases. 
As in the Bargaining treatment, in the ex-post choice subjects were reminded of the rule chosen by 
their pair and they could choose separately either a free percentage of the total product to ask for 
themselves, or a division corresponding to the application of the agreed rule, or a division 
corresponding to the application of a different rule. 
4.4. Beliefs and questionnaire 
In all the treatments, at the end of the ex-post choice, before a subject knew if his/her choice was 
selected for payment, first- and second-order beliefs were elicited by asking what s/he believed the 
																																								 																				
7If a pair reached an agreement on a rule during the chat, but one of the members chose the wrong rule on the screen, a 
warning message about the “mistake” appeared and the subject could make another choice.  Only one mistake was 
allowed.	
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other member of the pair had chosen (either one of the five rules or a percentage of total product) 
and what s/he believed the other member believed was her choice. Correct guesses were rewarded 
with one euro. Participants were also asked to fill in a questionnaire containing both socio-
demographic questions and questions about trust, risk attitude and happiness.8 In each treatment, in 
two sessions the questionnaire was administered at the beginning of the experiment, before the 
instructions about the phases of the experiment were read; and in two sessions it was administered 
at the very end of the experiment, just before the payment (note that our main empirical results are 
virtually unchanged when we consider this distinction). 
4.5 Sessions and procedures 
The experiment was programmed by using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the EGEO 
laboratory of the University of Granada. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of three euros. We 
adopted a between-subject design. No individual participated in more than one session.  
The average payment per participant was 9.80 € (including the show-up fee) and the sessions lasted 
approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes on average. 
In all the treatments, at the beginning of each session, participants were welcomed and asked to 
draw lots. They were then randomly assigned to terminals. The instructions were handed to them in 
written form and were read aloud by the experimenter. The participants had to answer several 
control questions, and we did not proceed with the actual experiment until all participants had 
answered all questions correctly. 
A total of 236 students participated in the experiment between May 2014 and March 2015. We ran 
four sessions of 20 subjects each for the Noveil and the Bargaining treatments, and four sessions, 
three with 20 participants and one with 16 participants, for the Chat treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
8 The questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 1. A synthesis of the structures of the three treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical hypotheses and their justification.  
 
Six main hypotheses, strictly connected with the theoretical framework presented in Sections 2 and 
3, underlie our analysis. In this section they are summarized and theoretical support for each of 
them is provided. 
 
In what follows, as we have done in Section 4, we will refer to the agreement characterizing both 
the Bargaining and the Chat treatments as the “ex-ante agreement”. We will name “ex-post choice” 
the final choice made by subjects in the latter division phase of the Noveil, Bargaining and Chat 
treatments. 
H1. In the ex-ante agreement (in both the Chat and the Bargaining treatments), subjects opt 
significantly more for the division of the total product consistent with the liberal egalitarian 
rule than for the other options of division.  
Random 
draw 
Random 
draw 
Random 
draw 
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This is a hypothesis on the choice across principles (or rules) only within treatments characterized 
by an ex-ante agreement. Its justification is that we conjecture that, even if the cognitive task for the 
liberal egalitarian rule is relatively more cumbersome than those for the alternatives, the immediate 
reasoning accomplished by subjects under the ‘veil of ignorance’ favors the liberal egalitarian rule. 
In other words, the impartial perspective taken by subjects under the veil induces them to prefer rule 
4.  
H2. Subjects opt significantly more for the division of the total product consistent with the 
liberal egalitarian rule in the ex-ante agreement (in both the Chat and the Bargaining 
treatment) than in the ex-post choice in the Noveil treatment.  
This is a hypothesis on the choice of the liberal egalitarian rule across treatments and compares 
somewhat spurious choices (i.e. the number of ex-ante agreements over liberal egalitarianism, when 
such agreements are allowed) with the number of liberal egalitarian separate division choices when 
as in Noveil the only decision available to subjects is the ex-post choice. Its justification is that we 
conjecture that the preference for liberal egalitarianism is largely conveyed by the ex-ante 
agreement under the veil of ignorance. Hence a treatment in which no choice under the veil is 
allowed should exhibit preferences in favor of rule 4 expressed only by those subjects who - so to 
speak - by themselves carry out an impartial reasoning but are not aided in doing so by the actual 
simulation of ‘veil of ignorance’ through an ex-ante agreement stage. In other words, the ex-ante 
decision situation of “agreement under the veil of ignorance” elicits impartial reasoning (or 
impartial reasoning comes to the subjects’ mind because of the ex-ante agreement situation). 
Consequently, we expect that liberal egalitarianism is chosen ex-post significantly less in the Noveil 
treatment than by decisions (agreements) under the veil in agreements treatments.      
H3. In the ex-post choice in the Chat and Bargaining treatment we should observe more 
subjects choosing the division of the total product associated with the liberal egalitarian 
rule than in the Noveil treatment. This is the effect of the ex-ante agreement, reached 
through Bargaining or Chat, on the subjects’ actual decision to select the division of the 
total product associated with the liberal egalitarian rule when they face the ex-post choice.  
Hypothesis H3 concerns the performance of the liberal egalitarian rule in the ex-post choice. It 
states that when ex-ante agreements are allowed, the number of ex-post choices for liberal 
egalitarianism should be higher, and what explains this increase is precisely that the ex-ante 
agreement affects the ex-post choices of the rule. This supports the theoretical hypothesis that the 
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ex-ante agreement may be understood as a player’s ‘reason to act’ in favor of playing the liberal 
egalitarian rule ex-post, which is translated into an effective causal force for playing it. Observing 
that subjects chose rule 4 in the ex-post decision, and that this decision is a consequence of the ex-
ante agreement, we may say that they are in fact carrying out a decision to comply intentionally and 
voluntarily with the agreed rule. Positive evidence with respect to these hypotheses would provide 
empirical support for the Rawlsian idea of an effective ‘sense of justice’ and the model of 
conformity preference (see Section 3 and note 3), even if complete coherence should consider 
preferences and beliefs simultaneously (see H6 hereafter). 
H4. The Chat treatment is more effective in inducing compliance than the Bargaining 
treatment. Chat is also more effective in affecting beliefs in the sense that first-order and 
second-order beliefs concerning reciprocal compliance with the agreement are mostly 
aligned in the Chat treatment and this explains why subjects comply with the agreement 
more in Chat than in Bargaining  
This hypothesis rests on the conjecture that if the veil of ignorance activates an impartial viewpoint 
that affects beliefs, ex-post preferences and choice, then this effect should be stronger in the case of 
the Chat treatment. The reason is that, in the Chat treatment, an ex-ante agreement is reached not 
only under the conditions of a veil of ignorance but also through deliberation, and with the 
possibility of putting forward impartial arguments during the agreement stage to convince the 
counterparties. We therefore conjecture that the impartiality of the agreementshouldbe clearer in the 
Chat than the Bargaining treatment. One tenet of deliberative democracy theory (Habermas 1996) is 
that impartial deliberation may affect the initial preferences whereby subjects enter the deliberative 
process,thus facilitating them in reaching impartial agreements. If “a common ground on questions 
of right and wrong, or fair and unfair can only be found through joint communicative processes 
between different actors" (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 4), we should observe a closer alignment of 
first-order and second-order reciprocal beliefs –beliefs consistent with mutual compliance with the 
agreement– in the case of natural-language discussion9. In other words, we will observe higher ex-
																																								 																				
9Full transcriptions of the chats (in Spanish) are available upon request. The transcription of a typical exchange may 
illustrate and help the reader to see the point (for anonymity, in all pairs subjects get the nickname “A” or “B”): “B: 
Hello; A: Hello. I suggest rule 4. What do you think?; B:  Rule 4? I thought of going discarding [different rules]; A: 
Discarding? B: but yes, 4 is appropriate. I meant, saying which rules we do not want. And which one we do want; A: So 
we agree on 4? - ? – If you want? B: What about rule 5? A: I prefer rule 4, because the final difference is not so big, and 
it [payoff] depends more on what each one does; B: well, okay. Rule 4 then? A: okay, perfect. We agree on 4; B: Do we 
click already? A: Yes; B: okay. 
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post compliance in Chat than in Bargaining, and the difference between the two should be 
attributable to the observation that Chat mostly induces aligned beliefs.   
H5.Compliance with the ex-ante agreement in which subjects choose the liberal egalitarian 
rule characterizes also subjects endowed with ten minutes of time, i.e. those who give up 
part of the output from their production when choosing that rule. 
This hypothesis is based on the theoretical conjecture that the motivational force behind the 
decision to carry out rule 4 in the ex-post choice –if the subjects have ex-ante chosen the liberal 
egalitarian rule – is truly a preference for compliance with the liberal egalitarian rule based on 
reasons of principle: the sense of justice expressed as adherence to a commonly agreed conception 
of fair distribution. The ‘crucial experiment’ with which to test the force of this motivation would 
be one able to disentangle it from the concurrence of any other motivations. The obvious candidate 
for such concurrence is the self-interest of those agents who could gain personally from 
implementation of this rule. Hence we must ascertain that ex-post adhesion to rule 4 is not solely by 
those who gain personally from it because they having been randomly assigned only six minutes to 
perform the task. That also the ‘lucky’ subjects (the ones endowed with ten minutes to perform the 
task) decide to carry out liberal egalitarianism in the ex post decision, after they have learned and 
exploited the advantage of the additional 4 minutes, would clearly show a counter-interested 
behavior (note, moreover, that by sharing the output of the additional four minutes they also set 
aside principles of remuneration according to work or productivity).10 All these explanations are 
compatible with the idea of a ‘sense of justice’ and the conformity preference theory (see again note 
3).   
H6 (a) Most of those who comply with the agreement to which they have subscribed also 
hold beliefs aligned with compliance. (b) Beliefs about the counterpart’s compliance are 
engendered by the ex-ante agreement. 
H6 concerns first-order and second-order beliefs about conformity, and it is split into two 
independent but complementary sub-hypotheses. The justification for H6 (a) is that taking it 
together with H3 we have the empirical hypothesis directly deriving from both the idea of a sense of 
justice and the equivalent theory of preferences for conformity with principles. The latter are based 
on two premises. First, an agreement under a veil of ignorance must be reached on a distributive 
																																								 																				
10Only in two pairs involved in the Chat and Bargaining treatments did the subject endowed with 4 minutes of time 
produce more than his/her counterpart. See note 12 for a robustness check when these pairs are excluded from the 
empirical analysis.	
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principle. Second, agents compliant with the agreement hold beliefs aligned with mutual conformity 
– i.e. each agent believes that the other participant will do his/her best in terms of the principle  
given what s/he believe about the agent’s own choice. When these two hypothesis are satisfied, the 
theory concludes that a psychological component positively enters the agent’s preference system 
(i.e. a “sense of justice” motivates compliance).  
In order to predict evidence consistent with the theory, however, H6(a) and H3 are necessary but 
not sufficient. Besides the evidence on those who comply with the agreement, it is necessary that a 
sufficiently high number of subjects who have ex-ante subscribed to an agreement hold beliefs of 
mutual compliance.  In order to make sense of this conjecture, we hypothesize with H6(b) that those 
who make an agreement will also hold mutually aligned beliefs consistent with reciprocal 
conformity, and this will happen because the agreement induces such beliefs. Thus, we expect that 
if a subject has agreed ex-ante on a rule, then s/he will hold the first-order belief that the 
counterparty in the agreement will comply with the rule, and the second-order belief that the 
counterparty also expects him/herself to comply with the same rule. Even if this hypothesis may 
seem psychologically natural, we admit that it is by no means trivial. In fact, in general respecting 
an agreement on a fairness rule like liberal egalitarianism or others considered here may contradict 
standard economic rationality (see appendix 1 for theoretical views that underpinthis hypothesis) . 
 
 
6. Hypotheses testing 
 
The presentation of the empirical results, both descriptive evidence and econometric estimates, is 
organized by hypotheses, each of the following sub-section being devoted to a single hypothesis, 
except for section 6.4, which investigates H4 and H5.  
In what follows we consider the ex-post choice of opting for a percentage equal to 50% or to 100% 
as equivalent to the ex-post choice of Rule 1 or 2, respectively. In fact, in terms of the ex-post 
division of the total production, opting for Rule 1 (Rule 2) in the ex-post choice is equivalent to the 
choice of opting for the 50% (100%). Results are virtually unchanged if we do not merge subjects 
who opted for the previous percentages in their division choices with subjects who opted for Rule 1 
or 2. When differences emerge in the econometric estimates, they are reported in the text or 
footnotes. 
 
6.1. H1: The choice in the ex-ante agreement. 
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Table 1 shows the percentages of subjects who chose the various rules across treatments. At a first 
glance, it is evident that Rule 4 was chosen by the great majority of subjects in the ex-ante 
agreement – 57.5% of subjects in the Bargaining treatment and 57.89% in the Chat treatment. The 
other rules chosen with greater frequency in the ex-ante agreement were Rule 3 and Rule 5 in the 
Bargaining and in the Chat treatment, respectively. In both cases, these Rules were chosen by less 
than half of the subjects who opted for Rule 4. A test of proportions revealed that both in the Chat 
and in the Bargaining treatment Rule 4 was chosen by a proportion of subjects significantly greater 
than 40%.11 Conversely, the same test revealed that the other rules were agreed by proportions of 
subjects equal to or lower than 20%.12. Therefore, the subjects’ choices seem to support H1, 
according to which the division of the total product consistent with Rule 4 is expected to be the 
most agreed rule in the ex-ante agreement. 
 
Table 1. The rule chosen across treatments (percentage values) 
Rule Noveil Bargaining Chat 
  
Ex-ante 
agreement  
Ex-post choice 
 
Ex-ante 
agreement 
Ex-post choice 
 
Rule 1. 
Pure Equal Split 
22.5 
 
12.5 
 
17.5 
 
15.79 
 
21.05 
 
Rule 2. 
One gets all 
13.75 
 
2.5 
 
3.75 
 
0 
 
7.89 
 
Rule 3. 
One gets what 
one has produced 
22.5 
 
 
15 
 
 
22.5 
 
 
5.26 
 
 
6.58 
 
 
Rule 4. 
Time 
independent 
division 
16.25 
 
 
57.5 
 
 
40 
 
 
57.89 
 
 
40.79 
 
 
Rule 5. 
Divide according 
to productivity 
10 
 
 
12.5 
 
 
10 
 
 
21.05 
 
 
17.11 
 
 
Rule 6. 
Percentage 
15 
 
Option not 
available  
6.25 
 
Option not 
available  
6.58 
 
																																								 																				
11 One-sample proportion test, p= proportion of subjects who agreed on Rule 4; H0 =0.4: Bargaining treatment, Ha: p != 
0.4, Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0014; Ha: p > 0.4, Pr(Z > z) = 0.0007; Ha: p < 0.4, Pr(Z > z) = 0.9993; Chat treatment, Ha: p != 0.4, 
Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0015; Ha: p > 0.4, Pr(Z > z) = 0.0007; Ha: p < 0.4, Pr(Z > z) = 0.9993.	
12 One-sample proportion test, p= proportion of subjects who agreed on the different rules; H0 =0.2: Rule 1: Bargaining 
treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) =0.0935; Ha: p < 0.2, Pr(Z > z) =0.0468; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 0.9532; Chat 
treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) =0.3588; Ha: p < 0.2, Pr(Z > z) =0.1794; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 0.8206; Rule 2: 
Bargaining treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0001; Ha: p < 0.2, Pr(Z > z) =0.0000; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 1.000; 
Chat treatment: no observations; Rule 3: Bargaining treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) =0.2636; Ha: p < 0.2, Pr(Z > z) 
=0.1318; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 0.8682; Chat treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) =0.0013; Ha: p < 0.2, Pr(Z > z) 
=0.0007; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 0.9993; Rule 5: Bargaining treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) =0.0935; Ha: p < 0.2, 
Pr(Z > z) =0.0468; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) = 0.9532; Chat treatment, Ha: p != 0.2, Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.8185; Ha: p < 0.2, 
Pr(Z > z) =0.5907; Ha: p > 0.2, Pr(Z > z) =0.4093.	
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6.2. H2: A comparison between subjects’ decisions in the ex-ante agreement and in the ex-post 
choice. 
 
When we compare ex-post choices made by subjects in the Noveil treatment and choices 
concerning the ex-ante agreement in the Chat and Bargaining treatments, we find that the 
percentage of subjects who chose the division consistent with Rule 4 was lower in the Noveil 
treatment (ex-post choice) than in the ex-ante agreement concerning the Bargaining (Pearson 
chi2(1), Pr=0.000) and the Chat (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.000) treatment.  
In order to check for the significance of differences between subjects’ decision in the ex-post choice 
in the Noveil treatment and their decision in the ex-ante agreement in the Chat and Bargaining 
treatments, we ran a Logit regression (Table 2). The dependent variable was a binary indicator 
(Rule_4_ex_ante-post) which identified subjects who opted for the division consistent with Rule 4 
in the Noveil treatment or in the ex-ante agreement in the Chat or Bargaining treatment. The 
independent variables of main interest were the dummies identifying the treatment in which 
subjects were involved, i.e. Chat (equal to one if subjects took part in the Chat treatment) and 
Bargaining (equal to one if subjects took part in the Bargaining treatment). Estimates included 
socio-demographic characteristics - i.e. age, sex, income, the propensity to take financial risk, 
religious orientation, the propensity to trust unknown others - controls connected with the 
experimental conditions - i.e. the number of words encrypted in the task, the number of words 
encrypted per minute - and the fact of having already taken part in Lab experiment13 (see Appendix 
2 for a description and descriptive statistics of all variables included in the estimates). These control 
variables have been excluded from the Tables for reasons of space. Full estimates results are 
included as Appendix 3. 
The significance of the two Chat and Bargaining variables clearly reveals that subjects opted 
significantly more for the division of the total product associated with Rule 4 in the ex-ante 
agreement than in the ex-post choice in the Noveil treatment.14 Moreover, the Wald test reported in 
the last line of Table 2 shows that no differences characterize the decision to opt for Rule 4 in the 
																																								 																				
13 Two tailed Kruskal-Wallis tests run for gender (p=0.0067), age (p=0.0026) and income (p=0.0698) revealed that the 
three sub-samples of subjects involved in the different treatments were not perfectly balanced with respect to these 
variables. We replicated all the estimates reported in the following tables by controlling for these differences when 
significant. In particular, we included in our regressions interaction terms (when statistically significant) between the 
two treatment variables Chat and Bargaining and the three variables Female, Age and Income. We report in the 
footnotes the main differences emerging when interaction terms are considered. 	
14When we consider interaction terms (see footnote 12), we find that the significance of the Bargaining variable slightly 
decreases (p=0.047).	
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ex-ante agreement when the Chat and the Bargaining treatment are compared. We conclude that our 
data give support to H2.  
 
Table 2.  
Ex-post choices in the Noveil treatment vs. ex-ante agreement  
in the Bargaining and Chat treatment 
 (1) 
 Logit 
Dependent variable: 
Rule_4_ex_ante-post - DV=1 if the division consistent with Rule 4 is chosen in the 
Noveil treatment or in the ex-ante agreement in the Chat and Bargaining treatment 
Chat 1.886*** 
 (0.397) 
Bargaining  1.847*** 
 (0.406) 
Constant 4.311 
 (7.180) 
Control variables YES 
Observations 236 
  
 
Pseudo R2 
0.1386 
Chat-Bargaining 0.038 
(0.343) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.3. H3: The treatment effect on the ex-post division choice 
 
When we focus on the ex-post choices, we observe that the division of the total production 
consistent with Rule 4 is most frequently chosen both in the Bargaining and in the Chat treatment, 
with percentage values equal to 40% and 40.79% respectively (Table 1). By contrast, in the Noveil 
treatment the majority of subjects opted for divisions associated with Rule 3 (22.5%). Moreover, the 
percentage of subjects who chose divisions consistent with Rule 4 was significantly lower in the 
Noveil treatment than in the Bargaining (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.001) and the Chat (Pearson chi2(1), 
Pr=0.001) treatment; conversely, no difference emerges between the Bargaining and Chat 
treatments (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.920). 
In order to check for the significance of the treatment effect on the ex-post division choice 
consistent with Rule 4, we ran Logit regressions (Table 3). The dependent variable was a binary 
indicator (Rule_4_ex-post) whichtook value 1 if subjects opted for a division consistent with Rule 4 
in their ex-post choice. The independent variables of main interest were the two dummies 
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identifying the treatment in which subjects were involved, i.e. Chat and Bargaining. Estimates 
included the same control variables as those included in Table 2 (see Appendix 2). Moreover, we 
considered a dummy variable (Rule_agr_4) equal to 1 if subjects involved in the Chat or in the 
Bargaining treatment opted for Rule 4 in the ex-ante agreement. This variable, included in Columns 
2, captured the role of the agreement in affecting subjects’ ex-post choice. 
Table 3 shows the estimate results. The last line of the Table reports Wald-tests useful for 
comparing subjects’ behavior in the Chat and the Bargaining treatments.  
The division consistent with Rule 4 was more likely to be chosen in the ex-post choice both in the 
Chat and the Bargaining treatment than in the Noveil treatment,15 while no differences emerge 
between Chat and Bargaining (column 1).16 These results support the hypothesis that Rule 4 is 
chosen significantly more in the treatment characterized by the agreement than in the Noveil 
treatment.  
Being involved in the Chat (Bargaining) treatment increases by 27.2% (26.4%) the probability of 
opting for the division associated with Rule 4 in the ex-post choice with respect to the Noveil 
treatment.  
As expected from H3, the dummy identifying subjects who opted for Rule 4 in the ex-ante 
agreement (Rule_agr_4) significantly affected the decision to select a division consistent with that 
rule in the ex-post choice (column 2). Moreover, it entirely explains the propensity to opt in the ex-
post choice for a division consistent with Rule 4 more frequently in the Chat and in the Bargaining 
treatment than in the Noveil one.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
15When we consider interaction terms (see footnote 12), we find that: a) the level of significance disappears for Men 
with respect to the Bargaing treatment; b) the level of significance decreases for Women, even though it remains within 
the 10% level (7.4%).	
16 When the interaction terms are considered, the difference between Chat and Bargaining emerges for Men, who opt for 
Rule 4 more in the Chat than in the bargaining treatment. 
17 When we consider interaction terms, this result is in general confirmed. Moreover, with specific respect to the 
Bargaining treatment, when controlling for Rule_agr_4 it turns out that Men choose Rule 4 less than in the Noveil. This 
further highlights the importance of the agreement in favouring the decision to opt for Rule 4 in the ex-post choice. 
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Table 3. Determinants of choice of the rule 
 (1) (2) 
 Logit Logit 
Dependent variable: Rule_4_ex-post - DV=1 if a 
division consistent with Rule 4 is 
selected in the ex-post choice 
 Whole sample 
Chat 1.231*** -0.344 
 (0.408) (0.545) 
Bargaining  1.201*** -0.326 
 (0.417) (0.553) 
Rule_agr_4  2.485*** 
  (0.448) 
Constant 13.12* 14.80* 
 (7.184) (8.684) 
Control variables YES YES 
Observations 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.0904 0.2262 
Chat-Bargaining 0.030 
(0.352) 
-0.018 
(0.405) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
6.4. H4, H5: Compliance across treatments, rules and differences in time endowments 
In this section we consider our fourth and fifth hypothesis (H4 and H5) and investigate the level of 
compliance characterizing subjects who opted for Rule 4 in the ex-ante agreement. 
We find that 59.62% of subjects complied with the rule chosen in the ex-ante agreement. The 
percentage increases in the case of the Chat treatment (71.05%) and decreases in the Bargaining 
treatment (48.75%). This difference is statistically significant (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.005). 
Moreover, compliance varies across rules and treatment (Table 4). The percentage of subjects who 
complied with the rule chosen in the ex-ante agreement is highest for subjects who agreed on Rule 1 
in the Chat treatment (91.67%). The lowest percentage concerns Rule 5 in the Bargaining treatment 
(20%). In the Bargaining and the Chat treatment, the percentage of subjects who opted for Rule 4 in 
the ex-ante agreement and complied with the agreement is equal to 54.35% and 68.18% 
respectively, even though this difference is not statistically significant (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.178).  
 
Table 4. Subjects who complied with the rule chosen in the ex-ante agreement – percentage values 
(absolute values in parenthesis). 
 Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 
Bargaining  50 
(5) 
50 
(1) 
50 
(6) 
54.35 
(25) 
20 
(2) 
Chat  91.67 
(11) 
No observations 50 
(2) 
68.18 
(30) 
68.75 
(11) 
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Table 5 shows the econometric analysis related to the determinants of compliance. Estimates 
consider only subjects involved in the Chat and Bargaining treatment. With respect to the estimates 
presented in Table 2, we added the following to the control variables: the rule chosen in the ex-ante 
agreement (Rule_agr_1, Rule_agr_2, Rule_agr_3, Rule_agr_5) - the residual category is 
represented by subjects who agreed on Rule 4; the payoff associated with the rule agreed in the ex-
ante agreement (Payment_agreement). In column 2 we include two dummy variables aimed at 
capturing the role of first-order and second-order belief, Belief_first=agr (DV=1 if the subject 
believes that the other player in the pair is going to comply), Belief_second=agr (DV=1 if the 
subject believes that the other player believes that s/he is going to comply). In column 3 we include 
a dummy identifying subjects with 10 time minutes (10_minutes). In column 4 we focus on subjects 
who chose Rule 4in the ex-ante agreement. By including the interaction term between 10_minutes 
and Chat, the estimate in column 5 checks for possible interaction effects concerning the 
endowment of time and the treatment. Our particular interest concerns subjects with ten minutes of 
time, since their incentives clashed with the adoption of this rule in the ex-post choice, meaning that 
they gave up part of the output stemming from their production when choosing the division related 
to Rule 4.18 
Table 5 shows that:  
a) the level of compliance is higher in the Chat than in the Bargaining treatment (column 1).19 
However, this effect is entirely explained by the role of beliefs. In fact, when the latter are included 
in the estimate (column 2), the difference in the level of compliance between subjects involved in 
the Chat and in the Bargaining treatment is no longer significant.20 Since the chat procedure is more 
effective than the bargaining procedure also in inducing beliefs about the counterpart’s compliance 
(see next section), this effect of beliefs is not surprising, and it is perfectly in line with H4, 
according to which the Chat treatment is more effective in inducing compliance (affecting subjects’ 
beliefs) than the Bargaining treatment. Moreover, second-order beliefs positively affect the decision 
to comply, while no effect emerges for first-order beliefs once both first-order and second-order 
beliefs are included in the regressions 
																																								 																				
18The results presented below hold also when we exclude from the analysis the two pairs of subjects involved in Chat 
and Bargaining treatment in which the subject endowed with 4 minutes of time produced more than his/her counterpart 
(see footnote 9).	
19 When we consider possible differences of behavior between Men and Women (see footnote 12), we find that this 
result holds only for Men.	
20 In this case, when the analysis takes specific account of differences between Men and Women, we find that Men still 
comply more in the Chat than in the Bargaining treatment.	
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b) no differences in the level of compliance emerge between subjects endowed with 10 and 6 
minutes of time (column 3). This result holds also with respect to the sub-sample of subjects who 
opted for Rule 4 in the ex-ante agreement (column 4), either within treatments (column 5, Wald test 
on the null that the sum of the coefficient of 10_minutes and 10_minute_chat is equal to 0: 
Pr=0.822) or across treatments (column 5, Wald test on the null that the sum of the coefficient of 
Chat, 10_minutes, 10_minute_chat is equal to 0: Pr=0.544).  
To sum up, empirical evidence seems to support both H4 and H5.  
The estimates in Table 5also show that the level of compliance is higher for Rule 1 than for Rule 4 
(Pr=0.015 –Table 5, column 2), Rule 3 and Rule 5 (column 2, probabilities concerning Wald tests 
on the null that the difference between the coefficients of Rule_agr_1 and Rule_agr_3, Rule_agr_5 
are: Pr=0.019, and Pr=0.028, respectively);21 
  
																																								 																				
21 When we do not merge subjects who opted for percentages equal to 50% and 100% with subjects who opted for Rule 
1 or Rule 2, respectively, the differences between Rule 1 and Rule 3 and Rule 5 are no longer significant at 10% level, 
while the difference between Rule 1 and Rule 4 is still significant but at a lower level (10% instead of 5%).	
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Table 5. The determinants of compliance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Dependent variable Compliance 
 All subjects involved in the Chat and 
Bargaining treatment 
Sub-sample of subjects who 
opted for Rule 4 in the ex-
ante agreement 
Chat 0.973** 0.553 0.553 -0.194 -1.490 
 (0.407) (0.470) (0.470) (0.655) (0.986) 
10_minutes   0.693 -3.174 -3.380 
   (2.389) (3.804) (3.843) 
10_minutes_chat     2.487* 
     (1.283) 
Rule_agr_1 1.720** 2.045** 2.113**   
 (0.731) (0.837) (0.872)   
Rule_agr_2 -2.393 -1.463 -1.588   
 (2.045) (2.430) (2.501)   
Rule_agr_3 0.280 -0.124 -0.0865   
 (0.670) (0.730) (0.741)   
Rule_agr_5 0.0659 0.0575 0.113   
 (0.638) (0.718) (0.748)   
Payment_agreement 0.0648* 0.0567 0.0595 -0.0503 0.00188 
 (0.0354) (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.151) (0.160) 
Belief_first=agr  0.597 0.572 1.116 0.978 
  (0.492) (0.499) (0.691) (0.721) 
Belief_second=agr  2.310*** 2.310*** 2.926*** 2.878*** 
  (0.530) (0.532) (0.831) (0.854) 
Constant 1.145 0.847 1.037 23.37 26.07 
 (14.66) (17.08) (17.12) (30.80) (31.94) 
Control variables	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations 156 156 156 90 90 
Pseudo R2 0.1596 0.2930 0.2934 0.3263 0.3596 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.5. H6: Ex-ante agreement, beliefs and compliance 
In this section we analyze the correlation among the choice of a certain rule in the ex-ante 
agreement, the belief that the other player is going to comply with the agreement, and the decision 
to comply (H6). 
70.51% of subjects believed that the other player in the pair was going to comply. The percentage 
increases to 78.95% when we consider the Chat treatment and decreases to 62.50% in the 
Bargaining treatment. This difference is statistically significant (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.024) . When 
we consider second-order beliefs, we find that 73.72% of subjects believed that the other player in 
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their pair believed that they were going to comply. The percentage increases to 86.84% when the 
Chat treatment is considered and decreases to 61.25% in the Bargaining treatment. This difference 
is statistically significant (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.000).  
Among those who complied, 77.42% believed that the counterpart would comply as well. This 
percentage increases when we look at the Chat treatment (87.04%) and decreases for the Bargaining 
treatment (64.10%), generating a statistically significant difference between the two treatments 
(Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.009). As regards second-order beliefs, 90.31% of subjects who complied 
believed that the counterpart believed that they were going to comply. Also in this case the 
percentage is significantly larger (Fisher's exact=0.032) in the Chat (96.30%) than in the Bargaining 
(82.05%).  
Finally, 73.12% of subjects who complied hadaligned first-order and second-order beliefs: that is, 
they believed that the counterpart would comply and believed that the counterpart believed that they 
would do the same. Also in this case, the percentage is significantly larger (Pearson chi2(1), 
Pr=0.000) in the Chat (87.04%) than in the Bargaining (53.85%) treatment. It should be noted that, 
in the Chat, all subjects who complied and believed that the counterpart was going to comply, also 
had the second-order belief aligned with compliance. Note that the differences in first- and second-
order beliefs between the Chat and the Bargaining treatment further confirm the higher 
effectiveness of the former in favoring the creation of beliefs coherent with compliance, as stated in 
H4 and commented on in the previous section. 
In Table 6 we analyze the relation between the decision to comply with the agreement and the 
reciprocal alignment of beliefs. Variable Belief_aligned_compliance takes the value of 1 for 
subjects who believed that the counterpart was going to comply (first-order belief) and, at the same 
time, believed that the counterpart believed that they would comply (second-order belief). The 
significance of this variable (at 1% level) in the regression presented in Table 6 – column 1, in 
which the dependent variable is the dummy taking the value of 1 for subjects who complied with 
the agreement, shows a strict connection between compliance and first-order and second-order 
beliefs concerning compliance. Moreover, we find that the alignment of belief, despite the 
differences characterizing the Chat and the Bargaining treatments,  is correlated with compliance 
also when we consider separately the sub-sample of subjects involved in each of these two 
treatments (Table 6, columns 2 and 3).22 This evidence supports H6(a). 
 
																																								 																				
22 When we do not merge subjects who opted for percentages equal to 50% and 100% with subjects who opted for Rule 
1 or Rule 2, respectively, the Belief_aligned_compliance variable becomes significant at 10% in column 3.	
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Table 6. Compliance and Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Method Logit Logit Logit 
Dependent variable Compliance 
 All subjects 
involved in the 
Chat and 
Bargaining 
treatment 
Sub-sample of 
subjects 
involved in 
the Chat 
Sub-sample of 
subjects 
involved in 
the Bargaining 
Chat 0.601   
 (0.421)   
Belief_aligned_compliance 1.894*** 4.449*** 1.130** 
 (0.431) (1.169) (0.558) 
Payment_agreement 0.0434* 0.0438 0.0184 
 (0.0244) (0.0508) (0.0285) 
Constant 8.253 4.454 16.04 
 (16.15) (33.82) (28.41) 
Control variables	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations 156 76 80 
Pseudo R2 0.2260 0.4651 0.2054 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To investigate H6(b), we compare first-order and second-order beliefs of subjects involved in the 
two Chat and Bargaining treatments with those of subjects involved in the Noveil treatment. We 
expect first-order and second-order beliefs to be aligned with the division rule chosen in the ex-post 
choice significantly more in the two treatments with the agreement than in the Noveil. That is, we 
expect to observe significantly more in the Chat and Bargaining than in the Noveil treatment 
subjects who believed: a) that their counterpart was going to choose the same rule that they would 
choose and b) that their counterpart believed that they were going to choose that rule. Moreover, we 
expect to find that this evidence is explained by the role of the agreement. 
We will test this hypothesis in three different steps. First, we will show that the alignment of belief 
with the rule actually chosen in the ex-post choice is more likely to be observed in the two 
treatments characterized by an ex-ante agreement than in the Noveil treatment. Second, we will 
show that this is due to the subjects whose first-order and second-order beliefs were aligned with 
the rule chosen in the ex-ante agreement. Therefore, we conclude that the higher probability of 
observing beliefs reciprocally aligned (and consistent with compliance) in the two treatments with 
the ex-ante agreement stems exactly from the agreement itself, which generates aligned beliefs 
concerning compliance with the ex-ante agreement.  
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As regards the first step, we note that only 17.5% of subjects had first-order and second-order 
beliefs aligned with the choice in the Noveil treatment. The percentage increases to 27.5% and to 
63.16% in the Bargaining and Chat treatment respectively. Overall, the difference in the alignment 
of beliefs between the treatments with the agreement and the Noveil treatment is statistically 
significant (Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.000). However, note that the significance is mainly due to the 
subjects involved in the Chat treatment. In fact, when we compare the Bargaining and the Noveil 
treatment we do not find a statistically significance difference characterizing the alignment of belief 
(Pearson chi2(1), Pr=0.130). Table 7, column 1, analyses the determinants of a dummy variable 
(Belief_aligned_division) capturing the alignment of belief with the ex-post choice (i.e. this variable 
assumes the value of 1 when first-order belief, second-order belief and ex-post division choice 
indicate the same rule).23 The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the NoVeil variable 
in column 1 - Table 7 confirms that being involved in the NoVeil treatment implies a lower 
alignment of belief with the ex-post choice than being involved in the other two treatments. Column 
2 confirms that this result is mainly due to subjects involved in the Chat treatment. In fact, we find 
that beliefs of subjects involved in the Bargaining treatment are significantly less aligned than 
beliefs of subjects involved in the Chat, and no differences characterize the alignment of beliefs of 
subjects in the Bargaining and NoVeil treatments (Wald test on the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of NoVeil and Bargaining is equal to zero: p=0.103)24.  
In order to investigate if the alignment of belief in the Chat and Bargaining treatment is due to the 
role of the agreement in inducing first-order and second-order beliefs concerning compliance, we 
include in the estimates the variable Belief_aligned_compliance: that is, the previously described 
variable which identifies subjects who believed that the counterpart was going to comply with the 
agreement and, at the same time, believed that the counterpart believed that they would 
comply.25Column 3 shows that, when we consider this variable, the relation between the different 
treatments and the alignment of beliefs completely changes. In particular, when 
Belief_aligned_compliance is included in the analysis, the coefficient of No_veil (column 3, Table 
7) becomes positive and significant.26 It reveals that the higher probability of observing the 
alignment of beliefs with the ex-post choice in the two treatments characterized by the agreement 
																																								 																				
23 Note that no subjects who chose the percentage in the ex-post division had first-order and second-order beliefs 
aligned with their choice.	
24 The difference becomes significant at 10% level when we do not merge subjects who opted for percentages equal to 
50% and 100% with subjects who opted for Rule 1 or Rule 2, respectively.	
25 Note that in Table 6 Belief_aligned_compliance only concerns subjects involved in the two treatments with the 
agreement. In Table 7, this variable takes the value of zero for all subjects involved in the Noveil treatment. 	
26 The significance of NoVeil is slightly lower (6.9%) when we do not merge subjects who opted for percentages equal 
to 50% and 100% with subjects who opted for Rule 1 or Rule 2, respectively 
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was entirely due to subjects who had beliefs aligned with compliance with the agreement. When we 
control for the effect of the compliance with the agreement on the alignment of belief with the ex-
post choice through a specific dummy variable (i.e., Belief_aligned_compliance), it turns out that 
the subjects were less likely to have beliefs aligned with the rule chosen in the ex-post choice in the 
Chat and Bargaining treatments than in the Noveil. Indeed, we conclude that the difference in the 
alignment of beliefs which emerges between the treatments with the agreement and the NoVeil is 
due to the ex-ante agreement and the beliefs coherent with compliance with the agreement itself.  
Finally, when we distinguish between the Chat and Bargaining treatments (Column 4), we find that 
the decisive role of the agreement in generating the closer alignment of beliefs (captured by 
including the variable Belief_aligned_compliancein the regression) is confirmed for both the 
treatments: a) beliefs are more aligned in the Noveil treatment than in the Bargaining treatment 
(Wald test on the null hypothesis that the coefficient of NoVeil and Bargaining is equal to zero: 
p=0.003)27; b) no differences in the alignment of belief emerge between subjects involved in the 
NoVeil and in the Chat. 
 
 
Table 7. Ex post division choice and Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Belief_aligned_division 
No_veil -1.495*** -2.100*** 1.910** 1.306 
 (0.370) (0.401) (0.800) (0.822) 
Bargaining  -1.408***  -1.289** 
  (0.363)  (0.516) 
Belief_aligned_compliance   4.857*** 4.863*** 
   (0.787) (0.812) 
Constant 6.176 6.412 6.401 5.368 
 (7.318) (7.185) (9.582) (8.979) 
Control variables	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations 236 236 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.0969 0.1487 0.4116 0.4328 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
27 P=0.011 if subjects who opted for percentages equal to 50% and 100% are not merged with subjects who opted for 
Rule 1 or Rule 2, respectively. 
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7. Final remarks: the significance of this study for the social contract theory of justice and 
business ethics.  
In this section we consider the meaning and implications of the results of this study in relation to 
our theoretical background on the social contract theory of justice and the advancement of 
contractarian business ethics. 
7.1. Ex-ante  preference for liberal egalitarianism and ex-post compliance   
The experiment’s main result is confirmation that a significant proportion of standard experimental 
subjects situated in a context of agreement ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ reach an agreed solution by 
opting for a distributive rule based on liberal egalitarianism. This result is remarkable insofar as the 
agreed solution in this case –as in most real cases in everyday economic life – requires a 
normatively complex argument regarding arbitrary initial endowments, individual effort, and 
dictatorial distributive decision. 
This seems to confirm the two-tier constitutional/post-constitutional approach to justice (see 
Section2 and Sacconi 2006, 2011b). It entails a descending hierarchy between the constitutional 
principle of distribution according to equality of production endowments and the post-constitutional 
distribution principle according to contribution. Even if subjects must choose a single principle of 
distributive justice that will regulate the outcome division after production has already taken place, 
they do not forget the requirement concerning the constitutional stage. Subjects claim redress for 
the initial injustice of the endowment allocation, asking for the fruit of unequal endowments to be 
redistributed equally. And they agree that only equal endowments may be used as the basis for a 
legitimate distribution according to contribution. 
It is intuitive that the veil of ignorance, by covering any individual bias, facilitates agreement on 
egalitarian distributive rules. In the absence of any reason for establishing personal differences, 
equal distribution is the salient solution in this situation. However, an egalitarian solution would not 
have been expected in our case, since the experiment involved a task, and the knowledge of each 
person’s contribution, by his/her own effort, to the common output. In this situation, equal 
distribution is by no means the most salient; the individual right to own output equally is. It could 
be argued that this is in fact the ‘social norm’ in most production contexts where individual 
production can be easily isolated or calculated: each gets what s/he has produced. The device of the 
veil of ignorance in the experiment made subjects aware of the arbitrary character of one crucial 
factor in determining individual production, i.e. the endowment of time; and they easily agreed to 
redress for that arbitrariness, thus restoring the egalitarian intuition, even if the productive nature of 
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the experiment seemed to cue for a solution based exclusively on individual production. Hence our 
result supports Rawls’s view that pure initial luck is not a rational basis for special claims on the 
total collective output. 
 
Our second main result is that subjects behave according to agreed principles –in particular, 
according to the liberal egalitarian principle. This is a crucial contribution to experimental ethics, 
since the experiment was designed, so to speak, against compliance: in the ex-post choice, subjects 
decided in the role of dictator and there was no ‘second round’ in which reputation effect could 
have an impact. Virtually any instrumentally and self-interested rational motivation to comply was 
removed. According to our hypotheses, compliance can only be explained because the subjects 
possessed a ‘sense of justice’ that was activated by the agreement behind the veil. The ex-ante 
agreement was taken as a rational commitment that held ex-post. Subjects who believed that their 
counterpart would act on the agreement were motivated to do so, contrary to the predictions of 
rational choice theory. And most of the subjects who especially agreed after the chat procedure 
believed that their counterpart would comply – even if this belief was not in accordance with the 
hypothesis of rational self-interest. Apparently, mutual trust emerges from deliberative agreement, 
which somehow elicits both beliefs of counterparty’s compliance and a (non-self-interested) 
preference for compliance, which we identify with the attitude that Rawls called the “sense of 
justice”. 
 
7.2.New insights into contractarian business ethics  
 
The function of the social contract as a philosophical device for the foundation of business ethics is 
to provide normative reasons supportive of certain governance rules. In this case, we focus on the 
distribution principle of the joint surplus generated by the productive activity in which the 
corporation consists. Admittedly, we do not account for all the details of joint production in the 
firm. Nevertheless, the basic issue of how different stakeholders (their social difference being 
represented by different ‘luck’ in the initial appropriation of endowments) may agree on a principle 
for the distribution of a surplus in order to cooperate in its production is represented in its essential 
features. This principle can be taken as representing the one basic distributive rule of the 
corporation, or else a component of a wider governance structure. In the contractarian view of the 
interaction amongst essential stakeholders of the firm, in fact, cooperation is voluntary and must at 
least in principle be acceptable by all of them. However it is interpreted, our experiment sought to 
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test whether real subjects, involved in the production of an outcome to be shared, would behave as 
mainstream twentieth-century contractarianism has predicted.  
The experiment makes several simplifying assumptions: we implicitly take the individual cost of 
effort to be nil or compensable; we also assume, with Rawls, individual talent to be a common 
asset; while acquired skills are treated as somehow individual. Assumptions of this kind may be 
objectionable if business ethics is understood as dealing with the conduct of businesses as they are. 
But the social contract tradition in business ethics adopts a critical stance. The contractarian 
argument is a counter-factual one, of course; and certain simplifications are required to put it to a 
test. Simplifications allow us to test the ‘empirical’ force of an agreement behind the veil of 
ignorance in a way that it could not be tested in real life.  
But our conclusions do have a bearing on the moral legitimacy of business. They speak to the many 
situations in business life where ideal conditions of justice –equality of endowment; equality of 
basic rights– do not hold. In these situations, distribution principles including redress are 
conceptually required, and, as our experiment shows, they are supported by laboratory evidence: 
subjects agree with them and behave in accordance with them when they are playing for money. 
If the social contract approach could only serve to identify the choice that would be taken in an 
ideally fair original position, it would have little relevance to the real world, and to business ethics 
as well. In the real world, stakeholders face given endowments of rights and production means, and 
they interact across the corporation, each claiming a remuneration that fairly reflects his/her 
contribution to the corporate surplus. But what we have in fact shown is that, even if the context is 
not that of an initial fair allocation of endowments, stakeholders will understand their remuneration 
– taking fair account of their contribution – in a clearly corrective way. Thus, stakeholders 
participating in an already-structured social production situation will decide to pay attention to the 
social contract perspective that requires equality in basic endowments. Hence they will agree to 
compensate the disadvantaged stakeholders through redistribution of part of the outcome, 
neutralizing the effects of the initial unfairness.   
Apart from the implications entailed by confirmation of the social-contract general hypothesis 
concerning just distribution in contexts of production, the experiment offers some suggestions for 
future research in business ethics. First, it recommends the device of the veil of ignorance as a way 
to elicit fair agreements. Obviously, the veil of ignorance cannot be implemented in reality (in 
collective bargaining, for instance), but it could be used as a learning device –for example, in 
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training– to help negotiators gain better understanding of the demands of impartiality.  Second, the 
higher mutual trust (first-order and second-order beliefs on compliance) elicited by the Chat 
treatment supports deliberative procedures to deal with conflicting distributive issues. Even in a 
deliberative situation, we claim that anonymity plays the key role in eliciting the agreement and 
compliance. Face-to-face discussion may hinder impartial agreement by turning the focus to 
particular interests. This should be ascertained in the future by means of laboratory or field 
experiments.  
  
38	
	
References 
Anderson, F., & Lyttkens, C.H. 1999.Preferences for equity in health behind a veil of 
ignorance.Health Economics,8(5): 369-78. 
Aoki, M. 1984.The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aoki, M. 2001.Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge Mass: The MIT press.  
Aoki, M. 2010.Corporations in Evolving Diversity, Cognition, Governance, and Institutions. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bacharach, M. 1994.The Epistemic Structure of a Game.Theory and Decisions, 37: 7-48. 
Bacharach, M., Gold N., & Sugden, R. 2006.Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in 
Game Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Baur, D., & Palazzo, G. 2011. The Moral Legitimacy of NGOs as Partners of 
Corporations.Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(4): 579-604. 
Binmore, K. 1991. Game Theory and the Social Contract. In R. Selten (Ed.), Game Equilibrium 
Models II, Methods, Morals, Markets. Berlin: Springer Verlag.  
Binmore, K. 2005. Natural Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bishop, J.D. 2008. For-profit corporations in a just society: a social contract argument concerning 
the rights and responsibilities of corporations. Business Ethics Quarterly,18(2): 191–212. 
Bond, D., & Park, J. 1991. An Empirical Test of Rawls’s Theory of Justice: A Second Approach, in 
Korea and the United States. Simulation Gaming, 22(4): 443-462. 
Brickman, P. 1977. Preference for Inequality.Sociometry, 40(4): 303-310. 
Brock, H.W. 1979.A Game Theoretical Account of Social Justice.Theory and Decision, 11: 239-
265. 
Buchanan, J.M. 1975. The Limits of Liberty, Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Cappelen, A. W., Moene, K. O., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2014). Just Luck : An 
Experimental Study of Risk Taking and Fairness. American Economic Review, 124(4), 1398–1413.  
Choen, G.A. 1989. On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.Ethics, 99: 906-944. 
De La Cruz-Dona, R., & Martina, A. 2000. Diverse groups agreeing on a system of justice in 
distribution: Evidence from the Philippines. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 11: 35-76. 
 
39	
	
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G.G. 2011. Individual risk 
attitudes: measurement, determinants and behavioral consequences. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 9(3): 522–550. 
 
Donaldson, T. 1982.Corporations and Morality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T.W. 1999.Ties that Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business 
Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Business School Press. 
Donaldson T., & Preston, L. 1995, The stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and Implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1): 65-91. 
Dunfee, T.W. 2006. A Critical Perspective of Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Recurring 
Criticisms and Next Generation Research Topics. Journal of Business Ethics,68(3): 303–328. 
Durante, R., Putterman, L., & Van der Weele, J. 2014. Preferences for Redistribution and 
Perceptiono Fairness: An Experimental Study. Journal of the European Economic 
Association,12(4): 1059-1086. 
Dworkin, R. 1981a. What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs,10(3): 185-246. 
 
Dworkin, R. 1981b. What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs,10(4): 283-345. 
Dworkin, R. 2013.Justice for Hedgehogs. Harvard (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
Faillo, M., Ottone, S. & Sacconi, L. 2015. The social contract in the lab.An experimental analysis of 
self-enforcing impartial agreements.Public Choice, 163 (3-4): 225-246. 
Francés-Gómez, P., Sacconi, L. & Faillo, M. 2015. Experimental economics as a method for 
normative busniess ethics.Business Ethics: A European Review, 24 (S1): 41-53. 
Freeman, R.E. 1994. The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 4: 409–421. 
 
Freeman, R.E., & Evan, W.M. 1990. Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation. Journal 
of Behavioral Economics,I/19: 337–359. 
 
Freeman, R.E. 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Boston: Pitman. 
Freeman, R.E., & Evan, P. 1988. Stakeholder Management and the Modern Corpora-tion: Kantian 
Capitalism. In T. Beuchamp & N. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical Theory and Business.(3rd ed.). 
Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C., & Parmar, B. 2011.Stakeholder Theory as a Basis for Capitalism. In 
L. Sacconi, M. Blair, R.E. Freeman, & A. Vercelli (Eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility and 
40	
	
Corporate Governance. The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines. (pp. 52–
72). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Frohlich, N., & Oppenheimer, J.A. 1990. Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with 
Production. American Political Science Review, 84(2): 461-477. 
Frohlich, N., & Oppenheimer, J.A. 1992. Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical 
Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J.A., & Eavey, C.L. 1987. Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice 
in Experimental Groups.American Journal of Political Science, 31(3): 606-636. 
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. 1989. Psychological Games and Sequential for Non-
Cooperative Games.International Journal of Game Theory, 5: 61–94. 
Grimalda G.L., & Sacconi, L. 2005. The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: 
Reciprocal Conformity to Morality. Constitutional Political Economy, 16(3): 249-276. 
Habermas, J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Herne, K., & Mard, T. 2008. Three Versions of Impartiality: An Experimental Investigation. Homo 
Oeconomicus, 25(1): 27-53. 
Herne, K., & Suojanen, M. 2004.The Role of Information in Choices Over Income 
Distributions.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2): 173-193. 
Holyoak, K.J., & Spellman, B.A. 1993. Thinking. In L. W. Porter & M.R. Rosenzweig (Eds.), 
Annual review of psychology, 44: 265-315. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Jackson, M. & Hill, P. 1995. A Fair Share, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7 (2), 169-180. 
Johnson-Laird, P.N., 1983.Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, 
and Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 1983  
Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Byrne, R.M.J. 1991.Deduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Keeley, M. 1988.A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations. Notre Dame (Indiana): University of 
Notre Dame Press. 
Konow, J. 1996. A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness.Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 31(1): 13-35. 
Konow, J. 2000. Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation 
Decisions.American Economic Review, vol. 90(4), pages 1072-1091. 
Konow, J. 2001. Fair and Square: The Four Sides of Distributive Justice. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 46(2): 137-164. 
41	
	
Konow, J. 2003. Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories.Journal 
of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239. 
Konow, J. 2005. Blind spots: The effects of information and stakes on fairness bias and dispersion. 
Social Justice Research, 18(4), 349–390.  
Legrenzi P., Girotto V., & Johnson-Laird, P.N. 1993. Focussing in Reasoning and Decision 
Making. Cognition, 49: 37-66. 
Lissowski, G., Tyszka, T., & Okrasa, W. 1991.Principles of Distributive Justice.Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 35(1): 98-119. 
Lütge, C. 2012.The Idea of a Contractarian Business Ethics. In Handbook of the Philosophical 
Foundations of Business Ethics: 647–658. Springer Netherlands. 
Lütge, C. 2015.Order Ethics or Moral Surplus. What Holds a Society Together? Lanham 
(Maryland): Lexington Books. 
Michelbach, P.A., Scott, J.T., Matland, R.E., & Bornstein, B.H. 2003. Doing Rawls Justice: An 
Experimental Study of Income Distribution Norms. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3): 
523-539. 
Nash, J. 1950. The Bargaining Problem.Econometrica, 18: 155-162. 
Phillips, R., 2003.Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Ethics. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers. 
Rabin, M. 1993. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. American Economic 
Review, 83: 1281-1302. 
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Reiter, R. 1980.A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13: 81-132. 
Roemer, J. 1996. Theories of Distributive Justice.Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Sacconi, L. 2000. The Social Contract of the Firm. Economics, Ethics and Organisation. Berlin: 
Springer Verlag. 
Sacconi, L. 2006b. A Social Contract Account For CSR as Extended Model of Corporate 
Governance (Part I): Rational Bargaining and Justification. Journal of Business Ethics, 68(3): 259-
281 
Sacconi, L. 2011a. A Rawlsian view of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): 
The Multistakeholder Model of Corporate Governance. In L. Sacconi, M. Blair, E. Freeman & A. 
Vercelli (Eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of 
Economic Theory and Related Disciplines. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
42	
	
Sacconi, L. 2011b. A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of Its Implementation (Part II): 
Fairness and Equilibrium. In L. Sacconi, M. Blair, E. Freeman & A. Vercelli (Eds.), Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and 
Related Disciplines. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sacconi, L. 2011c. A Rawlsian View of CRS and the Game of its Implementation (Part III): 
Conformism and Equilibrium Selection. In L. Sacconi and G. DegliAntoni (Eds.), Social Capital, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behavior and Performance. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Sacconi, L., & Moretti, S. 2008. A Fuzzy Logic and Default Reasoning Model of Social Norms and 
Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies. International Journal of 
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems,16 (1): 59–81. 
Sacconi, L., & Faillo, M. 2010.Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social 
contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence. 
Constitutional Political Economy, 21(2): 171-201. 
Sacconi, L., Faillo, M., & Ottone, S. 2011. Contractarian compliance and the ‘sense of justice’: a 
behavioral conformity model and its experimental support. Analyse&Kritik,33(1): 273-310. 
Scherer, A.G., & Palazzo, G. 2007. Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Responsibility: 
Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian Perspective. The Academy of Management 
Review,32(4): 1096–1120.	
Schildberg-Hörisch, H. 2010. Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment. 
Journal of Public Economics, 94(11-12): 1062-1066. 
Scott, J.T., Matland, R.E., Michelbach, P.A., & Bornstein, B.H. 2001. Just Deserts: An 
Experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4): 
749-767 
Searle, J.R. 2005. Rationality in Action. Cambridge Mass: The MIT press.  
Traub, S., Seidl, C., Schmidt, U., Levati, M. 2005. Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or 
Somebody Else?An Experimental Investigation of Distributive Justice.Social Choice and Welfare, 
24(2): 283-309. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice.Science, 211.4481: 453-458. 
Ulrich, P. 2008. Integrative Economic Ethics. Foundations of a civilized market 
economy.Cambridge University Press. 
Wempe, B., 2005.In defense of a self-disciplineddomain-specific social contracttheory of business 
ethics.Business Ethics Quarterly, 15:113–135. 
Yaari, M.E., & Bar-Hillel, M. 1984. On Dividing Justly. Social Choice and Welfare, 1, 1-24.  
43	
	
Appendix 1. Theoretical views that underpin hypothesis H6(b)  
 
As noted in section 5, hypothesis H6(b) may conflict with standard economic rationality. An ex-
ante unenforced agreement would not be complied with unless it is consistent with self-interested 
ex-post incentives – which is not the case in this experiment. Moreover, under the assumption of 
symmetrical economic rationality, a subject would not expect others to conform with an agreement 
on rule 4, and would not believe that s/he is expected to comply with it. Thus, what justifies 
observations concerning H6(b)? 
First, the intentional explanation of action (Searle 2005) suggests in our case that the content of the 
ex-ante agreement, i.e. dividing an outcome according to a rule, is a commitment to dividing the 
outcome according to the rule later on. Hence it is an intention to act. The agreement means 
undertaking a commitment. Having accepted (for some reason, such as impartiality, fairness, etc.) to 
subscribe to an agreement amounts to having a reason to act upon the corresponding commitment. 
A commitment is an intentional state for an action, which is not a desire-based, but a commitment-
based  reason to act (Searle 2005). By no means is this reason to act the only logically possible 
intention explaining action. Nevertheless, such an intentional state may translate into a preference to 
act upon the commitment and hence may be effective - among other intentions - in causing action. 
Only a free deliberation may pick this out of the admissible set of reasons to act, thus ‘filling the 
gap’ (Searle 2005) and letting it produce actual conduct.  
Second, this intentional explanation constitutes a mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird and Byrne, 1991,Holoyak and Spellman, 1993, Legrenzi et.al, 1993). Subjects, having agreed 
ex ante, may hold this model as the basis for interpreting and predicting ex-post actions of other 
subjects, consistently with the evidence that they have agreed on a rule. By no means is this the only 
logically possible interpretation of the situation. But agents do not have enough thinking resources 
to consider all the logically possible state of affairs; and as a matter of fact this is the mostly 
immediate intentional interpretation of their behavior elicited by the content of the agreement to 
which they have subscribed. Moreover, it fits the situation: it makes sense of the behavior of both 
the self and other agents by giving an intentional interpretation of their action.  
Third, the cognitive mechanism at work is framing (Bacharach 2006): because of the agreement, it 
comes to the subject’s mind the frame of an agent who acts upon a commitment, and hence has the 
intention to carry out the commitment. A frame delimits the ways in which a subject may ‘see’ or 
understand a given situation. In this case the frame coming to the agent’s mind is that subjects are 
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intentional agents acting upon the undertaken commitment, and as long as the situation is framed 
this way, there is no room for explaining subjects as agents pursuing their self-interest in the ex-post 
decision.  
Fourth, a frame defines the (necessarily incomplete) delimited base of knowledge whereby any 
default, fallible but nevertheless reasonable, prediction of the subjects’ behavior must be drawn by 
inference (Reiter 1980, Bacharach 1994, Sacconi 2000, Sacconi and Moretti 2008). A default 
inference works as follows: as long as there is no evidence contrary to the assumption that subjects 
satisfy the model of an intentional agent acting upon commitments, nothing contradicts that, if an 
agent has the commitment-based intention to act according an agreed rule, s/he will in fact carryout 
the rule. Whence a default reasoner derives the prediction that subjects will act according to their 
commitment. It may be wrong, of course. But this is the simplest intentional explanation and the 
only one consistent with the framed mental model of an intentional agent that delimits the ‘base of 
knowledge’ held by subjects.   
Summing up, moral reasoning behind the veil of ignorance leads mostly to an agreement on the 
liberal egalitarian rule, which is a commitment to redressingan unequal allocation of endowments 
ex post. Such a commitment provides a basis for a reasonto act that may translate into a preference, 
so that the agent acts not on a desire-based intention but on a commitment-based intention that may 
engender a preference(a reason-to-act-based preference). At the same time the commitment-based 
intentional explanation constitutes a model for understanding other agents’ behavior. Well-known 
cognitive constraints on reasoning, however, explain why this model rules out other in principle 
possible predictions of other agents’ behavior. Thus, as long as no contradictory evidence unfolds – 
i.e. by default – subjects expect that because they have agreed on a rule (and hence committed 
themselves to carrying out the rule) they will act accordingly. But this completes the picture about 
the emergence of the conditional desire to comply. Since the agent expects mutual conformity, the 
commitment-based intention is selected as the one effectively determining his/her choice, and hence 
how de factos/he desires to behave. This is not only consistent with the ‘sense of justice’ idea but 
also explains why so many subjects behaved consistently with this idea in our experiment. 
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Appendix 2 – Variable legend and descriptive statistics  
 Legend Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Bargaining 
 
DV=1 if subjects took part in the Bargaining 
treatment 
236 0.339 0.474 0 1 
Chat 
 
DV=1 if subjects took part in the Chat 
treatment 
236 0.322 0.468 0 1 
No_veil 
 
DV=1 if subjects took part in the Noveil 
treatment 
236 0.339 0.474 0 1 
Belief_first=agr DV=1 if the subject believes that the other 
player in the pair is going to comply 156 0.705 0.457 0 1 
Belief_second=agr DV=1 if the subject believes that the other 
player believes that s/he is going to comply 156 0.737 0.442 0 1 
Belief_aligned_compliance DV=1 if Belief_first=agr=1 and 
Belief_second=agr=1  156 0.571 0.497 0 1 
Belief_aligned_division DV=1 when first-order belief, second-order 
belief and ex-post division choice indicate 
the same rule 236 0.356 0.480 0 1 
Compliance DV=1 if subjects comply with the rule they 
agreed on in the ex-ante agreement 156 0.596 0.492 0 1 
Payment_agreement 
 
the payoff – in experimental tokens -
associated with the rule agreed in the ex-ante 
agreement 156 43.291 12.985 16.47 87 
Rule_agr_1 Dummy variables equal to 1 if subjects 
involved in the Chat or in the Bargaining 
treatment opt for one of the five different 
rules in the ex-ante agreement 
156 0.141 0.349 0 1 
Rule_agr_2 156 0.013 0.113 0 1 
Rule_agr_3 156 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Rule_agr_4 156 0.577 0.496 0 1 
Rule_agr_5 156 0.167 0.374 0 1 
Rule_4_ex_ante-post DV=1 if the division consistent with Rule 4 
is chosen in the Noveil treatment or in the 
ex-ante agreement in the Chat and 
Bargaining treatment 236 0.432 0.496 0 1 
Rule_4_ex-post DV=1 if a division consistent with Rule 4 is 
selected in the ex-post choice 236 0.318 0.467 0 1 
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10_minutes 
 
DV=1 if the subject is endowed with 10 
minutes of time 
236 0.500 0.501 0 1 
10_minutes_chat 
 
 
DV=1 if the subject is endowed with 10 
minutes of time and is involved in the Chat 
treatment 
236 0.161 0.368 0 1 
Control variables included in all the estimates 
Age Subject’s age in years 236 20.682 2.488 18 33 
Experiment 
 
DV=1 if the subject has already taken part in 
Lab experiment 
236 0.242 0.429 0 1 
Female DV=1 if the subject is a female 236 0.521 0.501 0 1 
Income 
 
 
Income level of the subject’s household, on 
a 5-level scale between 1 (less than 17,000€) 
and 5 (more than 120,000€) 
236 1.911 0.925 1 5 
No_religious DV=1 if the subject is not a believer 236 0.487 0.501 0 1 
Productivity Encrypted words per minute 236 4.586 0.958 1.33 6.83 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk aversion measure based on the 
following question: “Are you generally a 
person who is fully prepared to take risks or 
do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick 
a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 
‘unwilling to take risks’ and 10: ‘fully 
prepared to take risk”(see Dohmen et al., 
2011). 
236 6.458 1.846 0 10 
Trust 
 
DV=1 if the subject declares that, generally 
speaking, most people can be trusted 
236 0.233 0.424 0 1 
Words Number of words encrypted in the task 236 36.788 12.451 8 64 
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Appendix3. Full estimates results 
Table 2.  
Ex-post choices in the Noveil treatment vs. ex-ante agreement  
in the Bargaining and Chat treatments 
 (1) 
 Logit 
Dependent variable: 
Rule_4_ex_ante-post - DV=1 if the 
division consistent with Rule 4 is chosen in 
the Noveil treatment or in the ex-ante 
agreement in the Chat and Bargaining 
treatments 
Chat 1.886*** 
 (0.397) 
Bargaining  1.847*** 
 (0.406) 
Female 0.495 
 (0.309) 
Age -0.635 
 (0.649) 
Age2 0.0137 
 (0.0146) 
Income 0.0531 
 (0.167) 
No_religious -0.0160 
 (0.297) 
Trust 0.211 
 (0.360) 
Risk 0.0428 
 (0.0820) 
Experiment -0.0218 
 (0.383) 
Words -0.00600 
 (0.0158) 
Productivity 0.178 
 (0.211) 
Constant 4.311 
 (7.180) 
  
Observations 236 
  
Pseudo R2 0.1386 
Chat-Bargaining 0.038 
(0.343) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Determinants of choice of the rule 
 (1) (2) 
 Logit Logit 
Dependent variable: Rule_4_ex-post - 
DV=1 if a division 
consistent with Rule 4 
is selected in the ex-
post choice 
Chat 1.231*** -0.344 
 (0.408) (0.545) 
Bargaining  1.201*** -0.326 
 (0.417) (0.553) 
Female 0.469 0.347 
 (0.319) (0.356) 
Age -1.365** -1.552* 
 (0.650) (0.792) 
Age2 0.0295** 0.0345* 
 (0.0146) (0.0180) 
Income 0.114 0.124 
 (0.170) (0.189) 
No_religious -0.0833 -0.0747 
 (0.304) (0.338) 
Trust 0.581 0.696* 
 (0.360) (0.402) 
Risk 0.0333 0.0383 
 (0.0843) (0.0962) 
Experiment -0.234 -0.115 
 (0.407) (0.446) 
Words -0.0169 -0.0172 
 (0.0161) (0.0180) 
Productivity 0.122 0.106 
 (0.213) (0.239) 
Rule_agr_4  2.485*** 
  (0.448) 
Constant 13.12* 14.80* 
 (7.184) (8.684) 
Observations 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.0904 0.2262 
Chat-Bargaining 0.030 
(0.352) 
-0.018 
(0.405) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. The determinants of compliance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Dependent variable Compliance 
 All subjects involved in the Chat and 
Bargaining treatment 
Sub-sample of subjects who opted for 
Rule 4 in the ex-ante agreement 
Chat 0.973** 0.553 0.553 -0.194 -1.490 
 (0.407) (0.470) (0.470) (0.655) (0.986) 
10_minutes   0.693 -3.174 -3.380 
   (2.389) (3.804) (3.843) 
10_minutes_chat     2.487* 
     (1.283) 
Rule_agr_1 1.720** 2.045** 2.113**   
 (0.731) (0.837) (0.872)   
Rule_agr_2 -2.393 -1.463 -1.588   
 (2.045) (2.430) (2.501)   
Rule_agr_3 0.280 -0.124 -0.0865   
 (0.670) (0.730) (0.741)   
Rule_agr_5 0.0659 0.0575 0.113   
 (0.638) (0.718) (0.748)   
Female 0.471 0.949** 0.952** 0.502 0.779 
 (0.411) (0.472) (0.473) (0.642) (0.678) 
Age -0.245 -0.415 -0.466 -2.242 -2.539 
 (1.367) (1.589) (1.600) (2.939) (3.053) 
Age2 0.00347 0.00755 0.00872 0.0490 0.0574 
 (0.0317) (0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0693) (0.0719) 
Income 0.350 0.438 0.422 0.423 0.392 
 (0.241) (0.275) (0.281) (0.415) (0.422) 
No_religious -0.706* -0.746 -0.742 -0.642 -0.372 
 (0.389) (0.464) (0.463) (0.665) (0.702) 
Trust 0.840* 0.819 0.826 1.315 1.243 
 (0.491) (0.551) (0.551) (0.860) (0.871) 
Risk -0.0644 -0.0240 -0.0323 0.0559 0.101 
 (0.109) (0.122) (0.125) (0.201) (0.208) 
Experiment -0.773 -0.781 -0.779 -0.749 -0.947 
 (0.514) (0.589) (0.589) (0.897) (0.935) 
Words -0.0725** -0.0770** -0.115 0.188 0.0815 
 (0.0329) (0.0363) (0.136) (0.292) (0.301) 
Productivity 0.411 0.407 0.703 -1.060 -0.799 
 (0.288) (0.318) (1.069) (1.624) (1.653) 
Payment_agreement 0.0648* 0.0567 0.0595 -0.0503 0.00188 
 (0.0354) (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.151) (0.160) 
Belief_first=agr  0.597 0.572 1.116 0.978 
  (0.492) (0.499) (0.691) (0.721) 
Belief_second=agr  2.310*** 2.310*** 2.926*** 2.878*** 
  (0.530) (0.532) (0.831) (0.854) 
Constant 1.145 0.847 1.037 23.37 26.07 
 (14.66) (17.08) (17.12) (30.80) (31.94) 
Observations  156 156 90 90 
Pseudo R2 0.1596 0.2930 0.2934 0.3263 0.3596 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Compliance and Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Method Logit Logit Logit 
Dependent variable Compliance 
 All subjects 
involved in the 
Chat and 
Bargaining 
treatment 
Sub-sample of 
subjects 
involved in 
the Chat 
Sub-sample of 
subjects 
involved in 
the Bargaining 
Chat 0.601   
 (0.421)   
Belief_aligned_compliance 1.894*** 4.449*** 1.130** 
 (0.431) (1.169) (0.558) 
Female 0.673 1.019 1.091* 
 (0.429) (0.886) (0.617) 
Age -0.974 -1.024 -1.490 
 (1.506) (3.137) (2.676) 
Age2 0.0231 0.0294 0.0334 
 (0.0350) (0.0733) (0.0630) 
Income 0.390 1.351** -0.0237 
 (0.254) (0.580) (0.378) 
No_religious -0.961** -0.844 -0.867 
 (0.420) (0.831) (0.567) 
Trust 0.575 0.372 0.679 
 (0.511) (0.940) (0.790) 
Risk -0.0364 0.598** -0.321* 
 (0.114) (0.293) (0.176) 
Experiment -0.875 -2.806** -0.460 
 (0.545) (1.147) (0.769) 
Words -0.0580** -0.0555 -0.0500 
 (0.0274) (0.0518) (0.0382) 
Productivity 0.214 -0.706 0.578 
 (0.290) (0.672) (0.395) 
Payment_agreement 0.0434* 0.0438 0.0184 
 (0.0244) (0.0508) (0.0285) 
Constant 8.253 4.454 16.04 
 (16.15) (33.82) (28.41) 
    
Observations 156 76 80 
Pseudo R2 0.2260 0.4651 0.2054 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Ex post division choice and Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Belief_aligned_division 
No_veil -1.495*** -2.100*** 1.910** 1.306 
 (0.370) (0.401) (0.800) (0.822) 
Bargaining  -1.408***  -1.289** 
  (0.363)  (0.516) 
Belief_aligned_compliance   4.857*** 4.863*** 
   (0.787) (0.812) 
Female -0.330 -0.149 0.179 0.293 
 (0.306) (0.323) (0.403) (0.416) 
Age -0.644 -0.563 -1.015 -0.852 
 (0.664) (0.649) (0.871) (0.812) 
Age2 0.0145 0.0120 0.0235 0.0200 
 (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0197) (0.0181) 
Income 0.216 0.164 0.397* 0.371* 
 (0.162) (0.168) (0.206) (0.210) 
No_religious 0.0418 -0.0884 -0.218 -0.306 
 (0.295) (0.310) (0.389) (0.399) 
Trust 0.578* 0.582 0.288 0.273 
 (0.349) (0.362) (0.451) (0.466) 
Risk -0.0744 -0.0526 -0.00575 0.0146 
 (0.0813) (0.0844) (0.105) (0.108) 
Experiment 0.0297 0.177 0.503 0.563 
 (0.382) (0.393) (0.501) (0.500) 
Words -0.00220 0.000331 -0.00336 -0.00591 
 (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0205) (0.0213) 
Productivity 0.182 0.0981 0.00224 -0.0425 
 (0.211) (0.221) (0.274) (0.280) 
Constant 6.176 6.412 6.401 5.368 
 (7.318) (7.185) (9.582) (8.979) 
     
Observations 236 236 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.0969 0.1487 0.4116 0.4328 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The instructions and the questionnaire actually used in the experiment are available on a pdf file 
here: 
 
https://goo.gl/v9SIIV 
 
 
